technical innovations for reducing use and emission of EDTA by Conrad, Jobst
 FORSCHUNGSSTELLE FÜR UMWELTPOLITIK 
Freie Universität Berlin 
Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften 
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft 
 
   FFU-report 00-04 
Environmental Policy Regulation  
by Voluntary Agreements:  
Technical Innovations for Reducing 



























FORSCHUNGSSTELLE FÜR UMWELTPOLITIK 
Freie Universität Berlin 
Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften 
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft 







 +49-30-838 566 87 









1 Purpose and methodology of the case study...................................................1 
2 The physical and social setting....................................................................2 
3 Case history.............................................................................................5 
3.1 Annual EDTA meetings and voluntary declarations.................................5 
3.1.1 History and formation of the EDTA declaration.................................5 
3.1.2 Efforts and problems to implement the EDTA declaration..................10 
3.2 Producers, suppliers, users................................................................17 
3.3 Examples of innovation efforts............................................................18 
3.3.1 EDTA biodegradation by bacteria....................................................18 
3.3.2 Process optimisation and substitute development by the main  
producer of EDTA........................................................................19 
3.3.3 Development of the substitute IDS..................................................20 
3.3.4 Avoiding EDTA application in whey processing................................22 
3.3.5 Reduction of EDTA release in the photographic industry....................25 
4 Actors and networks..................................................................................27 
4.1 Differing actor interests, perceptions, and strategies................................27 
4.2 Regulatory, business and knowledge networks......................................30 
4.3 The role of environmental policy actors..................................................33 
5 Innovative solutions to an environmental problem?.......................................33 
5.1 The crucial significance of cognitive framing..........................................34 
5.2 The central role of market opportunities and corporate capacities.............36 
5.3 The impact of political action and regulatory framework conditions...........37 
6 Interpretation perspectives........................................................................39 
6.1 Structural framework conditions............................................................39 
6.2 Actor networks and institutional eigendynamic.......................................40 
6.3 Varying problem perspectives and strategies for solutions.........................41 
6.4 The role of policy making and interpolicy coordination...............................42 




AIS Association Internationale de la Savonnerie, de la Detergence et des Pro uits 
d'entretien 
AIF Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller Forschungseinrichtungen (federation of industrial 
cooperative research bodies) 
ARW Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rhein-Wasserwerke (working group of rhine water 
utilities) 
AWBR Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wasserwerke Bodensee-Rhein (working group of lake 
Konstanz water utilities) 
AWWR Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wasserwerke an der Ruhr (working group of Ruhr water 
utilities) 
BASF Badische Anilin und Soda Fabriken 
BfG Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde (federal agency of hydrology) 
BGA Bundesgesundheitsamt (federal health agency) 
BgVV Bundesamt für gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutz und Veterinärmedizin (federal 
agency for consumer health and veterinary medicine, established separately after 
the dissolution of the BGA in 1994) 
BGW Bundesverband der Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft 
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie 
(federal ministry of education and research) 
BMFT Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie (predecessor of BMBF till 
1984) 
BMG Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (federal ministry of health) 
BMI Bundesministerium des Innern (federal ministry of interior, responsible for 
environmental affairs till 1986, when the BMU was established) 
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (federal 
ministry of the environment, nature conservation and nuclear safety) 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (federal ministry of economic affairs 
BUA Beratergremium für umweltrelevante Altstoffe (advisory council for environmentally 
relevant existing chemicals 
CEFIC Conseil Européen des Fédérations de l'Industrie Chimique 
DBU Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt (federal German environment foundation) 
DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German research society) 
DVGW Deutscher Verein des Gas- und Wasserfaches (German association of gas and 
water utilities) 
EP environmental policy  
ETP ecology-oriented technology policy 
ESWE a water utility based institute of water research and water technology 
IHO Industrieverband Hygiene und Oberflächenschutz (industry association hygienic 
and surface protection) 
IKW Industrieverband Körperpflege- und Waschmittel (industry association body care 
and washing agent) 
LAWA Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser (working group water of German states) 
MELF Landesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (state ministry for 
agriculture) 
NGO nongovernmental organisation 
PTWT Projektträger Wassertechnologie (research project management body "Water 
technology and sludge treatment") 
R&D research and development 
TEGEWA Verband der Textilhilfsmittel-, Lederhilfsmittel-, Gerbstoff- und Waschrohstoff-
Industrie (industry association of raw materials and auxiliary products for textiles, 
leather, tanning and washing agents) 
TZW Technologiezentrum Wasser of the DVGW (technology centre water) 
II 
UBA Umweltbundesamt (federal environmental agency) 
VCI Verband der chemischen Industrie (association of the German chemical industry 
WaBoLu Institut für Wasser-, Boden- und Lufthygiene (the institute is part of UBA since the 
dissolution of the BGA in 1994) 
ADA alanine diacetic acid 
DTPA diethylene triamine penta-acetic acid 
EDDS ethylene diamine di-succinic acid 
EDTA ethylene diamine tetra-acetic acid 
IDS imino di-succinic acid - (sodium salt) 
ISDA iso serine di-acetic acid 
MGDA methylglyzine di-acetic acid 
MSA maleic acid anhydride  
NTA nitrilo tri-acetic acid 
PASP polyaspartic acid sodium salt 
PDTA propylene diamine tetra-acetic acid 
 
Summary 
This case study investigates bargaining and innovation processes around efforts to 
reduce and to substitute production and use of EDTA between 1985 and 1999. Envi-
ronmental policy succeeded in stimulating efforts to significantly reduce EDTA release, 
in particular by aspiring to a voluntary declaration and subsequent voluntary 
agreements. Supported by continuous debate in EDTA meetings and by the eigen-
dynamic of commitments made by participating actors, these efforts led to substantial 
results, though not as much as had been envisaged. The environmental innovations 
arising typically were technical process innovations or a combination of product and 
process innovation rearranging and optimising chemical processes in various industries 
using EDTA. Concerning producers and suppliers of chelating agents, their EDTA-
related innovative efforts were embedded in general research programs elucidating the 
pronounced strategic capabilities of large corporations in managing innovations. 
Without significant public funding policy making and interpol cy coordination of 
environmental policy and ecology- riented technology policy in most cases had at best 
an indirect impact on these innovation processes reinforcing them to some degree by 
promoting regulatory framework conditions and monitoring programs. Consequently, 
various relatively separated knowledge, business and regulatory networks originated 
from these EDTA-related innovative efforts. Comparing different R&D projects leading 
to technically viable environmental innovations of reducing, substituting, or degrading 
EDTA (use), the central importance of corporate capacities and market opportunities for 
their successful diffusion becomes obvious. Thus, serious obstacles to the innovation 
processes referred more to their social than to their technical and time dimension. 
Altogether, environmental policy successfully organised multiple efforts to reduce EDTA 
release on the basis of voluntary agreements in Germany. These voluntary agreements 
enhanced, but did hardly induce corresponding environmental innovations, mainly in 
industry, and also contributed to learning processes among the actors, participating in 
EDTA discourse and politics, in the direction of a more holistic (policy) perspective 
towards ecological sustainability. 
1 Purpose and methodology of the case study 
This case study investigates bargaining and innovation processes around efforts to 
reduce and to substitute production and use of EDTA (ethylene diamine tetra-acetic 
acid) between 1985 and 1999.1 EDTA is a powerful chelating (organic sequestering) 
agent used since 1939 which binds cations and thus primarily inactivates metal ions 
which could cause undesired reactions, otherwise. EDTA has many favourable proper-
ties when used in chemical engineering processes, such as high stability of metal-
EDTA complexes, solubility in water, insolubility in organic solvents, no volati ity, high 
stability against hydrolysis, i.e. resistance against strong acids and lyes. Therefore, 
EDTA is used as an additive to sequester undesirable cations in many areas, such as 
washing and cleansing products, cleaning, electroplating, water softening, polymeri-
sation for industrial purposes, photographic industry, textiles, pulp and paper, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food and agriculture. Nearly all of these applications will 
eventually result in the release of EDTA to the environment, in many cases via the 
sewage system. EDTA biodegradability is low so that heavy metals bound to EDTA 
may well be transported in water. In order to keep EDTA concentration in rivers and 
drinking water low, particularly in Germany efforts have been undertaken since the late 
1980s to reduce EDTA emission by substitution and changes in technical processes.  
The main purpose of the case study is to study the influence of regulatory networks and 
framework conditions upon corresponding innovation processes, particularly the role of 
environmental policy (EP) and technology policy (TP) and their mutual coordinati n 
within this context (IIUW 1998). 
The study is mainly based on 17 loosely structured interviews with key persons involved 
in these regulatory and innovation processes, either on a face-to-face basis (8 
interviews lasting 1 to 2 hours) or by telephone (9 interviews lasting between 15 and 45 
minutes). In addition, UBA allowed me to study its EDTA files containing hundreds of 
records with position papers, meeting documents, surveys of EDTA measurements, 
research papers etc. Furthermore, some other literature and documents dealing with 
EDTA and its substitutes have been studied. The draft report of the case study has 
been circulated to the intervi wees for critical reading and comments, which have been 
taken into account according to my personal assessment, provided that I received 
them. Finally, supplementary (corrective) information, obtained at the 14. EDTA 
meeting in November 2000, in which I participated, has been added to the draft report. 
The interviews were made with representatives of the following institutions (index t = 
telephone interview): BMU (2t), UBA (1), technical university Braunschweig, institute of 
biochemical engineering (1), research center Karlsruhe, institute for technical chemistry, 
section water technology (1t), DVGW research unit, university of Karlsruhe (1t), ESWE 
institute for water research and water technology (1), BASF (1), Bayer AG (1t), 
DiverseyLever (1), Fuji (1t), Kodak AG (1t), MILEI (1t), IHO (1), TEGEWA (1), VCI (1t), 
association of the photochemical industry (1). 
                                                
1  It has been funded by the EU Commission as part of the ENVINNO-project (IIUW 1998). 
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The details of regulatory networks and innovation processes were successively 
recognised and understood during the various subsequent interviews, mainly conducted 
in December 1999, so that critical questions about controversial issues and less openly 
presented intangibles could be posed on a better knowledge basis particularly in the 
later interviews. 
From a methodological point of view, the demand to perform an (in-depth) case study 
within one month of workload necessarily implies limited validity of its results for several 
reasons. 
1. It allows hardly any (systematic scientific) verification procedures beyond confront-
ing individual interviewees with diverging opinions of other persons interviewed and 
beyond asking the interviewees for corrections of and critical comments on the draft 
report.2 
2. Neither detailed analysis of all EDTA files of UBA, nor study of relevant contextual 
literature on environmental impacts of chelating agents, on biodegradability, on 
contamination of substances and waters, on business conditions in the various 
application areas, on corporate strategies, and on varying regulatory contexts were 
feasible. 
3. The whole setting of overlapping EDTA stories is too complex to allow a detailed 
analysis and description of specific innovation processes and of informal agree-
ments and arrangements behind the scenes within the manifold specific EDTA case 
histories pointed out below. Thus, a scientific assessment of the validity of the case 
history and of its interpretation in social, political and ecological terms presented 
here was not possible either. 
4. The presentation of the case study on about 50 pages does not allow to eventually 
discuss subtleties and different possible interpretations of the innovat o  processes 
reconstructed. 
2 The physical and social setting 
This section describes the physical and social setting of EDTA-related regulations and 
innovations by pointing out the essential structure of (potential) ecological and health 
problems due to EDTA, the profile of EDTA utilisation, some relevant legal and market 
conditions, and the feasible options to master the EDTA problem environmentally. 
EDTA as a chemically rather stable powerful chelating agent inactivating metal ions 
offers very favourable properties for industrial purposes. However, although not strictly 
connected to these properties, it is normally not readily biodegradable as an 
anthropogenic substance, too. Whereas its genuine environmental and health risks 
appear to be small and may be judged acceptable, its potential indirect impacts 
particularly by chelating heavy metals and thereby channelling them through waste 
water treatment plants may well be hazardous for the environment and human health 
                                                
2 This methodical intricacy has to be underscored, in particular, when taking into account the varying 
cognitive framings of the EDTA issue by different actors, described below. 
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though rather improbable to occur under normal circumstances (cf. AIS 1987, BUA 
1996). According to the precaution principle (laid down in the German drinking water 
ordinance), however, man-made substances should not be contained in drking water 
in non-marginal concentrations, and their elimination out of water resources should not 
require special (technical) provisions by water supply utilities. 
Furthermore, substitutes of EDTA with appropriate complexing characteristics may well 
tend to imply similar and other new, yet (first) unknown environmental impacts. In 
addition, evaluating the relative preferability of EDTA versus substitutes has to take into 
account ecological trade-offs, for instance better biodegradability versus potential 
cancer potential of NTA, trade-offs between technical effectiveness and environmental 
compatibility (e.g. strong versus weak complexing agents), and economy-ecology trade-
offs, for example high production costs of a suitable substitute that, however, may be 
applied effectively for quite special purposes only. Thus, even opposing judgements 
about the need to reduce and to avoid EDTA emissions for environmental or health 
reasons, and therefore about the ecological value of R&D efforts to substitute EDTA 
may well claim legitimacy. 
In view of the manifold application fields of EDTA and of its favourable properties 
compared to potential substitutes no universal substitute suitable for all purposes is 
likely to exist, as discovered and accepted during the early 1990s. As a consequence, 
quite different innovative efforts have been necessary to avoid or to reduce EDTA 
release. Because of their limited reach and uncertain (economic) advantages success 
or failure of these (often small and adaptive) innovations manly depend on the specific 
framework conditions prevailing in a country at present, and typically not on a scientific 
break-through. 
In addition, measurements of EDTA concentrations in rivers, which indicate overall 
(local) emission quantities, tend to shw quite some variability according to their 
arrangement and criteria. Furthermore, recording amounts of EDTA sold does not 
simply reflect the amounts of EDTA applied in a country because of significant EDTA 
exports and imports. The same holds true for EDTA concentrations in rivers, which 
reflect exports and imports of EDTA emissions by a country. Finally, EDTA users 
frequently do not know the composition of their chemical products applied, and 
therefore if they use EDTA or not.3 Thus, reduction and avoidance of EDTA emissions 
require corresponding knowledge by quite a few actors involved in respective uses. 
In Germany, the total amount of EDTA used was around 4.500 tons during the early 
1990s with an overall declining tendency (25% -30 ), whereas it was around 30.000 
tons per year in Western Europe with a slight trend upwards.4 Release into wastewater 
and rivers amounted to around 1.000 tons in Germany annually with a decrease of 
about 25% - 30% during the 1990s. The distribution of different areas of EDTA 
application shows about the following pattern in Germany, though with large relative 
                                                
3 However, EDTA is meanwhile listed as a relevant substance for use of detergents in many manuals. 
4 This was accompanied by an increasing use of NTA and DTPA as major EDTA substitutes in 
Germany, less observed on the EU level. 
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alterations during the 1990s and in other countries: photo chemicals 30%, cleaning and 
detergents in business 25%, cleaning and detergents in households 2%, food and 
agriculture 5%, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 3%, water treatment 1%, pulp and 
paper 2%, textiles 3%, flue gas desulphurisation in the power plant Buschhaus 9%5, 
others 20%. Large decreases could be observed particularly for cleaning and 
detergents in households (application of substitutes), photographic processing 
(application of the substitute PDTA, rearrangements of photochemical technology), 
textiles, cosmetics, the galvanic industry (nearly 100% because of the prohibition to 
release EDTA into waste water), and partly for pulp and paper.6 The main areas of 
EDTA application that are still able in 2000 to contribute considerably to reduce EDTA 
use relate to industries developing photos and using detergent products. 
In principle, there exist four (technical) options of reducing and avoiding EDTA release 
in industrial processes: 
1. renunciation of EDTA, when complexing of heavy metals is not really necessary, 
2. reduction of EDTA use by rearranging industrial processes towards better utilisaion 
of EDTA, for instance via recycling and integrated production cycles, 
3. degradation of EDTA into ecologically harmless metabolites by biochemical 
decomposition, by burning, or by reusing EDTA containing wastes, as in flue gas 
scrubbers, that finally burn or decompose EDTA. 
4. development and application of EDTA substitutes. 
Now the viability and advantage of each option depends on the prevailing economic, 
sociopolitical and legal conditions, which show quite some complexity in their 
arrangements and vary considerably from case to case, as illustrated by the following 
examples. 
NTA is recommended as a substitute of EDTA within reasonable limits by UBA, 
whereas NTA use is not recommended or even restricted to special applications in 
some other countries because of its assumed but not finally approved potential 
carcinogenicity, which undermined the willingness of suppliers7 and users to substitute 
NTA for EDTA in Germany, too. 
The substitute MGDA produced by BASF is not always a technically feasible substitute, 
rather expensive, and therefore only slowly and partially accepted by suppliers and 
users of complexing agents. 
Using the equally slowly biodegradable complexing agent DTPA in the pulp and paper 
industry has led to similar DTPA concentrations measured in rivers despite lower 
                                                
5 Because waste management occurs by burning and underground deposition of filter ashes, EDTA is 
not released into surface waters in this case. 
6 This holds for Germany but not for quite some other European countries, because DTPA was applied 
instead of EDTA in Germany, mostly from the very beginning of peroxide bleaching, with EDTA, 
however, still arising as a metabolic decomposition product of DTPA. 
7 In this report the manufacturers of EDTA-containing products such as detergents or cleaning products 
are termed suppliers, or formulators occasionally, because they buy EDTA from EDTA producers in 
order to formulate their products, which they then sell to their customers as the actual EDTA users.
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amounts needed per production unit so that the EDTA problem has not really been 
solved but only shifted to the environmental and health hazards of another complexing 
agent. Furthermore, EDTA is a metabolite of DTPA, representing ca. 30% to 50% of its 
biological decomposition. 
Because the environmental, health and labour safety hazards of EDTA have been still 
assessed by a risk assessment procedure of the EU Commission (UBA 2000) until 
recently, the results of which will influence the future (legal) acceptability of EDTA use, 
other independent efforts of EDTA reduction attracted less (probably costly) support by 
user companies beforehand. 
Because there are no unequivocally compelling arguments in favour of EDTA reduction 
and avoidance, user companies see no convincing reason to invest in costly 
rearrangements of their production or cleaning processes for this purpose.
Water utilities oppose for good economic reasons legal requirements based on health 
criteria to invest in further water treatment devices to eliminate unwanted materials from 
water, if this end-of-pipe solution can be avoided at the emission source of such 
undesired substances. 
Biological degradation of EDTA may well offer a comparatively cheap option to EDTA 
release into rivers, but producer and user companies may prefer the application of 
EDTA substitutes for reasons of sunk costs or convenience, particularly if biological 
degradation requires rather sophisticated treatment plants on the user side. 
3 Case history 
The following section describes the case history at three levels: political bargainin  
processes providing the framework conditions and political pressure to reduce EDTA 
release; EDTA-related interests and interaction pattern of producers, suppliers and 
users forming these reduction efforts; and selected R&D efforts to realise in practice the 
envisaged reduction objectives. 
3.1 Annual EDTA meetings and voluntary declarations 
3.1.1 History and formation of the EDTA declaration 
In Germany the phosphate limiting ordinance in 1980 set a limit to phosphate c ntents 
in detergents and cleaning products and induced, among others, efforts to search and 
develop organic phosphate substitutes, such as NTA. The environmental impacts of 
NTA on water bodies were investigated from 1981 to 1984 in a study commissioned by 
the BMI, at that time still responsible for environmental affairs. Open questions, 
formulated in this study, were dealt with in subsequent research projects from 1985 
through 1990, their results being presented in a final colloquium and published in 1991 
(Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe 1991). Altogether, it was concluded that NTA is well 
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biodegradable and has rather limited environmental impacts so that its limited utilisation 
appears tolerable. 
These research projects requiring close to 1,5 million Eur  were jointly funded by the 
BMBF, the BMU and by NTA-related industries (i.e. IKW, BASF), which also agreed to 
a voluntary self-obligation in 1986 to use NTA as little as feasible in order to avoid 
eventual prohibition of NTA. Significant politico-economic driving forces in this direction 
resulted from the minimization rule of health policy for anthropogenic substan e , 
particularly in drinking water, even without regard of the still questionable carcinogenic 
risk potential of NTA, from corresponding pressu e of water utilities against NTA 
release into water bodies, and from competing interests of large corporate p oducers of 
detergents and washing agents (cf. Henkel, Procter & Gamble) concerning the phos-
phate substitutes Zeolite A and NTA. This context explains why NTA met ambivalent 
assessments by relevant actors later, when discussed as reasonable substitute of 
EDTA in respective EDTA meetings. 
Now, within monitoring programs of NTA concentrations in aquifers and rivers during 
the mid-1980s, considerable EDTA concentrations up to 50 or even 100 µg/l were 
detected, too, that were much higher than those of biodegradable NTA (<10µg/l).8 
These incidental unforeseen findings, together with the not yet well understood 
remobilisation effects of EDTA on heavy metals, were the starting point of intentional 
EDTA reduction efforts, investigated in this case study, because they generated 
concern in key actors such as water research institutes, water utilities, water authoriti s, 
environmental ministries and EDTA producers. 
On the one hand, BASF as the main German producer of EDTA was aware of the 
controversial (public) debate about NTA use and risks and the respective general 
minimization objective of NTA use and thus NTA production, and had an interest to 
maintain the positive atmosphere of a laboriously established dialogue between the 
chemical industry and the water supply industry. And BASF was already engaged in 
general wastewater reduction programs, and made efforts to develop marketable EDTA 
substitutes. Ther fore it was clearly interested in avoiding public controversy on EDTA 
with exaggerated risk perception and corresponding bureaucratic overregulation, in a 
pragmatically and technically reasonable approach towards probable reduction of 
EDTA use, and in getting a reliable assessment of the probable future regulatory 
handling of EDTA and its potential substitutes. On the other hand, the BMU was 
interested in acquiring sufficient information about the size and application areas of 
EDTA use as well as about its environmental impacts and possible substit tes, in - after 
public debate about phosphate and NTA emissions - avoiding public criticism of 
insufficient environmental care for chelating agents, and in arriving at a kind of 
covenant together with relevant social actors to reduce EDTA emissions. This latter 
objective was considered favourable because the BMU was well aware of legal 
problems in principle to forbid EDTA, for its risks did hardly justify such a ban which - 
                                                
8 According to BASF (1987) EDTA concentrations in previous years had been higher than around 1986, 
if they could have been measured, because of higher amounts of EDTA use. 
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even if passed - could not be rapidly implemented either because of predictable 
accompanying law suits. 
It was within these framework conditions that the responsible ministerial director took 
action from 1986 on to arrange a round table meeting on EDTA with key actors in order 
to exchange information and to generate a framing and management perspective on 
this issue. In September 1987 14 persons participated in the first so-called EDTA 
meeting, mainly representing environmental policy (BMU, UBA (7)) and EDTA 
production (BASF (3)), supplement d by water research, health policy (BGA-WaBoLu) 
and agricultural policy. On this meeting various aspects of EDTA use were presented 
by BASF (see BASF 1987) concerning amounts used, market structure, options to 
reduce release into water bodies, possible wat r treatment technologies, scepticism of 
non-German industry concerning the need to reduce EDTA use, and an environmental 
impact assessment. Conclusions were drawn concerning different activities to gain 
more detailed information about application areas of EDTA, about substitution options 
for EDTA, about environmental and health impacts and related water standards, and 
about EDTA concentrations in surface waters, to promote appropriate measures of 
reducing EDTA emissions in various industries, and to reflect the relevance oflicensing 
EDTA as a food additive by the EU Commission. This kind of issues remained major 
topics on the agenda of EDTA discussions and meetings till to the present.
Accompanying (informal) discussions served to disseminate factual knowledge and to 
clarify misinterpretations of EDTA use and impacts, for instance concerning its slow 
biodegradability, the need to distinguish primary use of NTA in detergents from the use 
of EDTA in many areas, detergents being only one of them, or the limited re obilisation 
of heavy metals by EDTA in rivers due to its still insignificant concentration and to the 
already bound metal ions in EDTA-chelating complexes released in waste water. 
The overall development of EDTA policy and regulation can be characterized as a 
development from controversy to cooperation with the voluntary EDTA declaration in 
1991 as the major turning point. 
Controversial positions due to diverging interests, that can be found in the position 
papers presented in the following years by different actors such as UBA, BGA, VCI and 
others, were reflected in differing EDTA-related cognitive problem definitions, evaluative 
judgements, measures recommended, and assumptions about the motivations 
underlying the activities of their opponents. Conflicts existed not only between 
economic interests of EDTA producers and users, and ecological interests of EDTA 
avoidance advocates, but also between differing EP approaches, advocate  by waste 
water and water quality representatives favouring emission standards or quality targets 
for EDTA, between environmental policy and health policy concerning in particular the 
suitability of NTA as an EDTA substitute, between different EDTA producers and 
suppliers as well as between research groups developing differing solution options, 
each favouring just those EDTA substitutes or biodegradation systems developed and 
advanced by itself, respectively. 
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Thus, UBA for instance recommended in 1989/90 legally non-bindi g environmental 
quality targets of 1 or 10 µg/l for stationary and flowing surface waters, respectively, 
arguing with toxicity, induced algae growth and limitations to chelated heavy metals. In 
view of the ban on atracine in 1991, the limit value of 0.1 µg/l for single pesticides in 
drinking water, and the comparatively very high EDTA concentrations found in rivers, 
water research institutes and water supply utilities demanded a ban on EDTA if 
possible because anthropogenic and not readily biodegradable substances should not 
be released into water bodies and not contained in drinking water, and - i  accordance 
with the polluter-pays-principle - the user of EDTA and not the water utilities suffering 
from EDTA release should care for the elimination of EDTA, as by ozoning techniques. 
The BGA or BgVV, respectively, were cautious not to condemn EDTA and to argue in 
favour of its careful use because of its low health risks and the potential carcinogenicity 
of the substitute NTA. Different technological options to substitute or to degrade EDTA 
were promoted and extolled by their corresponding innovation networks and evaluated 
sceptically and subtly rejected by the competing innovation groups. 
On the other side, the VCI underlined the largely given environmental compatibility of 
EDTA and indicated the insufficient scientific validity of studies pointing out 
environmental impacts of EDTA because of their dependence on certain physical and 
chemical conditions not representative for real world conditions, because of studies with 
contrasting results, and because of unproven assumptions made. Furthermore, the VCI 
emphasized the feasibility of EDTA elimination technologies such as ozoning for water 
utilities, if this should be considered necessary at all because the EDTA concentrations 
in waters typically observed would imply no health risk. EDTA users interested in 
avoiding the costs of rearranging the processing combinations in their plants argued 
with their ignorance of the formulae in the detergents and cleaning agents they use, the 
role of imported EDTA in case of a national ban on EDTA production, and the environ-
mental compatibility of EDTA, too.9 
Assumptions about the underlying intentions of their opponents probably show aspects 
of projection of their proponents confirming the validity of the Thomas theorem10. Thus, 
on the one hand, representatives of EDTA producers and users interpreted the initiative 
action of BMU administration to reduce EDTA emissions mainly as a means to protect 
the environmental minister against external criticism of insufficient action, or interpreted 
the strong protest of water supply utilities against EDTA as proxy conflict because of its 
tolerable environmental impacts, or criticized lacking coordination between federal and 
local policy, between chemicals policy and water policy, as well  lacking pragmatic 
political flexibility, thereby ignoring a similar lack of coordination between EDTA 
producers, suppliers and users, and lacking flexibility to rearrange their equipment and 
processing technology in order to reduce EDTA use and release. Representatives of 
UBA, on the other hand, tended to insist on strict and detailed regulations because of 
                                                
9 From these types of reasoning it is obvious that different cognitive frames of actors were advanced by 
the actors involved in the EDTA policy game according to their interest in further utilising, or in reducing 
and avoiding EDTA. 
10 If man defines a situation as real, it will be real in all its consequences. 
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the assumed inherent tendency of industries to circumvent any imprecise or non-
compulsory environmental regulation or agreement. 
Taking into account existing framework conditions, the strategy to follow a consensual 
approach towards a voluntary agreement of relevant actors in favour of reducing EDTA 
emissions appeared to be not only a reasonable, but probably the best EP option to 
arrive at protective environmental action beyond mere exchange of information. The 
relevant framework conditions were the following ones: 
1. strong protest and pressure of water utilities in view of comparatively high EDTA 
concentrations in rivers, 
2. no scientifically proven severe environmental or health risks of EDTA justifying its 
legal ban, 
3. therefore little chance to rapidly enforce - without long lasting law suits - a legal 
prohibition of EDTA and to implement it, 
4. a manifold and internationally shaped market structure of EDTA supply and use 
with varying national (regulatory) EDTA arrangements hard to control by (national) 
policy prescriptions, 
5. however, trustworthy threat of regulatory arrangements forcing industries to avoid 
EDTA release according to then issued formal administrative rules.11 
Because neither the UBA proposal to introduce quality standards of 10 µg/l or less as 
recommended objectives to be reached for EDTA concentrations nor counter 
suggestions of the VCI (and some other industry actors) aiming at 50 µg/l had a chance
to become generally accepted, the idea to reduce EDTA load in water bodies by a 
certain percentage over a certain period of time, which was first articulated by a 
representative of the BfG in 1990 and then consequently pursued by the responsible 
BMU official, gained growing support by the relevant actors. That happened because 
EDTA-related industries saw an economically realistic potential to halve total EDTA 
loads by reducing EDTA release by one third, by substituting one third of EDTA 
applications, and by keeping the last third of EDTA uses, and because water utilities 
and emission oriented environmentalists in EP-related institutions perceived this flexible 
reduction concept as better than nothing, after their preferred stricter EDTA limitation 
strategies proved politically unviable. 
Following about another year of bargaining and persuasion within and outside the newly 
established practice of annual EDTA meetings, the EDTA declaration was agreed upon, 
published in the joint ministerial periodical gazette in 1991, propag ted subsequently, 
and supported by additional actors.12 The EDTA declaration as a legally non-bi ding 
document expressed the willingness of the signatories, namely BMU, BMG, BMFT, VCI, 
BASF, BGW, DVGW, ARW, AWBR and AWWR, to strive for a reduction of EDTA load 
in rivers and lakes by one half within about five years by ecologically favourable 
                                                
11 One example is annex 40 of the German waste water administrative regulation issued in 1989 which 
required the galvanic industry to avoid any EDTA release into waste water. In 1992, corresponding 
EDTA emissions had been reduced by one half.
12 Water utility groups and LAWA did not sign the document because it did not have the status of a 
formal governmental regulation. 
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substitutes and by the development and use of appropriate technologies to avoid and to 
reduce EDTA in waste waters, and to document and control progress by regular 
measurements in surface waters. 
After this pragmatic flexible strategy of a medium term 50% EDTA reduction until 1996 
had been consensually adopted leaving (sufficient) latitude for case-spe ific 
interpretation according to the interests of actors involved, the subscribing participants 
of the EDTA discourse felt bound to the declaration even if they doubted later if they 
would sign it once more. As a consequence, they tried to do their best to contribute to 
the declaration's objectives and correlated tasks as long as these efforts were in 
relative harmony with their genuine interests. 
The number of participants in the continuing annual EDTA meetings doubled from more 
than 20 in the early 1990s to close to 50 in the late 1990s. This reflected th  
broadening problem recognition by and the inclusion of various political, industrial and 
R&D organisations important for the practical realisation of the declaration, for instance 
state ministries, water utility groups, research institutes, and industrial associations 
representing EDTA users.  
3.1.2 Efforts and problems to implement the EDTA declaration 
After 1992 these EDTA meetings were organised by UBA because of a considerable 
reduction of corresponding personnel in the BMU, on the one hand, and becuse 
delegation of this duty by the BMU to the technically more competent UBA personnel 
appeared convenient for organising the technical implementation of the declaration. 
The corresponding activities undertaken and problems to be discussed during the 
1990s can be enumerated as follows: 
1. Empirical information had to be gathered about  
– the pattern of EDTA amounts applied for different purposes, of (local) EDTA 
emissions into surface waters, of EDTA concentration and degradation in surface 
waters, and of EDTA concentrations in drinking water; 
– the significance of EDTA volumes imported and exported by transportation in 
rivers; 
– environmental and health impact studies of EDTA; 
– and varying national and EU attitudes, strategies and regulations vis-à-vis EDTA. 
Furthermore, the validity of the data collected had to be assessed. These activities 
contributed to recognising the actual complexity of the EDTA issue and the at first 
forgotten significance of EDTA users when realising EDTA reduction strategies. 
2. The problem of variable data was particularly significant for the EDTA measurement 
programs in surface waters, because their results depended on measurent 
techniques as well as on the frequency of samples taken that varied according to 
the differing parameters and criteria of the overall measurement programs on water 
quality pursued by German states, within which EDTA concentrations were 
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determined.13 Depending on measurement technique and reference material 
chosen, measurement results of concentrations of chelating agents in waste water 
may well vary up to a factor of 10.14 Variations in EDTA measurements led to 
continuous irritation, debate on appropriate measuring procedures, and a need for 
their explanation in the annual EDTA meetings. Even at the EDTA meeting in 2000 
contradictory data, indicating about 25% or about 50% overall reduction in EDTA 
loads or concentrations in German surface waters from 1991/92 to 1999, were 
presented without their proponents being able to give unequivocally clear 
(methodical) reasons for these discrepancies in spite of their political significance.15 
Nevertheless, when the degree of achieved reduction of EDTA loads in surface 
waters had to be assessed in the late 1990s according to the EDTA declaration, 
there was substantiated consensus that the data indicating ca. 30% reduction were 
reliable and valid ones. 
3. Often agreed upon in the EDTA meetings, various (participating) institutions 
prepared papers presenting the results of their inquiries partly moulded by their 
position on EDTA as indicated above in this section. In such cases the position 
papers were countered by papers of other organisations with opposing interests, 
such as the VCI questioning the legitimacy of UBA recommendations. These 
papers can be interpreted as the main part of the ongoing process of appropriate 
problem definition and negotiating EDTA-related action strategies. 
4. Concerning the various EDTA reduction activities, many case-specific organisa-
tional and financing decisions had to be taken by public and private institutions. Of 
particular interest for this case study are decisions about the size and distribution of 
R&D funds. Interestingly, because no ban on EDTA was strived for by (environ-
mental) policy, which would require sufficient scientific justification of inherent 
environmental or health risks and/or of suitable substitutes of EDTA, the majority of 
R&D funding of up to approximately 100 million Euro, most of which addressed the 
development of EDTA substitutes, came from industrial corporati ns primarily for 
inhouse, but also for external projects. Some funding came from (industrial) founda-
tions, too. After having still spent considerable funds for R&D projects on NTA 
during the 1980s within the context of the phosphate limiting ordinance ETP spent 
some resources (around 0,5 million Euro) on intentional biodegradation of EDTA, 
funded by the BMBF, and on properties, production, application and emission 
quantities of 18 different chelating agents, funded by UBA since 1999.16 
                                                
13 Therefore, the demand to change costly water quality measurement programs in order to harmonize 
EDTA measurement techniques could not claim high legitimacy. In addition, however, participation of 
some states in or some measurement spots of EDTA measurement programs were suspended 
because of scarce financial resources. 
14 Meanwhile the ESWE institute has submitted a measurement technique based on 13C-is tope-
labelled reference material to be accepted as official standard procedure to reliably determine 
concentrations of chelating agents. 
15  However, for instance a study elaborating systematic procedures towards a comprehensive balance of 
emissions of EDTA and other slowly degradable chelating agents has been commissioned by the 
environmental agency of the state Baden-Württemberg in 2000. 
16  First research results, presented by the commissioned ESWE institute at the 14. EDTA meeting, 
clearly distinguished between different chemical groups of chelating agents, criticised the unavailability 
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5. Research projects besides genuine R&D efforts to reduce EDTA loads in water 
bodies refer to measuring EDTA concentrations, to inquiring features of EDTA sale 
and use, to investigating environmental, health and labour impacts of EDTA, or to 
studying similar properties of EDTA substitutes. Funding and performance of this 
type of studies, not investigated further here in this report, have been typically done 
more by and in public institutions (e.g. BUA 1996, the above mentioned study 
funded by UBA, the EU risk assessment on EDTA). In contrast, market oriented 
R&D on EDTA substitutes or on improving processing technologies typically has 
been carried out within industries concerned. 
6. The option to biologically degrade EDTA in sewage plants has been pursued by 
several biotechnological set-ups. Because most of them attempted by industry did 
not work satisfactorily or only under specific atypical conditions (e.g. biodegradation 
of EDTA in waste water under atypical alkaline conditions of pH >8,5), the R&D 
projects of EDTA degradation by micro-organisms pursued by a university research 
group since 10 years at present do receive further support for scaling-up 
experiments and industrial application neither by industry nor by public funds. Thus, 
biodegradation of EDTA by biotechnological set-ups currently is not pursued as a 
major practical option except for specific purposes. 
7. A lot of substitutes and also alternative processing technologies concerning EDTA 
use have been developed and introduced in the market by different companies, 
both for broad range application and for specific purposes. The main results of 
these efforts and accompanying learning processes were that a substitute with 
similar favourable properties offered by EDTA could not be found, that different 
substitutes for different conditions and objectives had to be developed, that one 
major task was to find the right balance between efficacy and biodegradability of 
chelating agents, that higher production costs of substitutes, especially when 
combined with lower than EDTA efficacy, worked as a strong barrier to market 
acceptance due to the market power of EDTA users, and that the recognition of 
EDTA as an environmental problem and the timing of testing and installing new 
technological arrangements were crucial for the willingness of EDTA users to 
change their manufacturing or cleaning systems accordingly. Altogether, well 
biodegradable substitutes such as citrate or tartrate were no effective alternatives, 
substitutes such as PDTA, or enzymatic membrane cleaning systems often were 
applicable for specialised purposes only (bleach-fix baths, whey-processing), 
substitutes such as DTPA (pulp and paper) or NTA (detergents) are frequently used 
but critically evaluated concerning potential environmental or health risks, and 
medium-strong chelating agents such as MGDA, IDS, or EDDS have - with the 
backing of large chemical companies - reasonable market chances, though still for 
limited application areas only. 
8. BASF as the main producer and also an important user of EDTA in Germany took 
considerable efforts within a general program of minimizing emissions in the late 
1980s and early 1990s to reduce EDTA release in waste water by systematic 
                                                                                                                                                            
of crucial data, and recommended the development of standardized methods of analysi . 
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optimisation of EDTA production processes, by integrating processing technology 
arrangements of various production processes in closed cycles, by reprocessing 
EDTA containing wastes, by substituting EDTA in quite a few production schemes, 
and by developing and testing various substitutes with only MGDA left at present, 
whereas NTA and DTPA had already been produced in the 1980s, too. BASF thus 
reduced EDTA release from 670 tons in 1986 to 138 tons in 1991 and to about 38 
tons in 1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively. Now an emission level has been 
reached where further reductions require unproportional investments, even if an 
emission reduction strategy corresponds to the strategic orientation of BASF to sell 
EDTA to customers instead of releasing it into wasteter. 
9. These studies and R&D projects, and corresponding EDTA meetings and debates 
strongly contributed to generating a more complex and differentiated knowledge 
and problem perspective on the EDTA issue among many participants of the EDTA 
discourse, and can thus be interpreted as important social learning process. It 
helped to recognise uncertainties and still new EDTA-related problems, such as 
unknown environmental impacts of EDTA metaboli es, and to widen the problem 
horizon of the debate on EDTA towards a comparison of the benefits and 
environmental costs of chelating agents in general, and towards an emphasis on 
problems instead on technology or a substance, when asking for the need, benefits, 
and risks of a specific chelating agent. 
10. A crucial task in approaching the 50% EDTA reduction objective was the control of 
factual reduction figures in EDTA use and load as pointed out above. Partly, the 
information gathering and measurement programs listed above followed this task. 
Furthermore, EP institutions, especially UBA, realised the limited validity of (soft) 
figures on (reduced) EDTA use provided by industrial associations because of their 
interest in presenting favourable figures, and because these depended on incom-
plete and voluntary informations by subsidiary associations (e.g. TEGEWA or IHO 
informing VCI) or by corporate members (e.g. informing TEGEWA or IHO). As a 
consequence UBA approached industrial sectors and companies applying EDTA 
more directly in order to thereby induce awareness and reduction of EDTA emis-
sions. Finally, this task implied detecting and closing loopholes in environmental 
regulations utilised by companies to circumvent prescriptions requiring prevention of 
EDTA emission. 
For instance, annex 53 to the waste water administrative regulation applying § 7a of 
the federal water act (WHG), concerning waste water discharges of the 
photographic industry, first issued in 1993, required zero discharge of waste water 
stemming from the treatment of bleaching and bleach-fix baths. As long as photo 
laboratories could claim, however, not to have treated these baths, they were legally 
not forced to avoid EDTA wastewater discharges in spite of the corresponding 
intention of annex 53. 
11. Following the "discovery" of EDTA users UBA took efforts to approach specific user 
groups, to gain information about their EDTA application patterns, to convince them 
to reduce EDTA use or release, and to jointly formulate leaflets raising their 
14 
awareness of the environmental relevance and reduction potentials of EDTA.17,18 
After having recognised the EDTA issue and being somehow convinced to support 
reduction objectives the corresponding industry sector associations such as IHO or 
TEGEWA undertook efforts to draw attention to the EDTA topic and to induce 
action to reduce EDTA release among their members mainly by information 
dissemination and persuasion because they only dispose of persuasive instruments 
vis-à-vis their members. Parallel to this growing awareness EDTA users and 
customers of EDTA containing products exerted some pressure on EDTA suppliers 
to avoid this ingredient in their products. Thus, environmental policy, persuasive 
action of industrial associations and market pull worked together to effect reduction 
in EDTA use. 
12. However, because the rearrangement of industrial processes and machinery 
typically is an expensive step, and because in most cases neither the environm tal 
risks known nor existing environmental regulations urged (small and medium sized) 
companies to replace EDTA by possibly doubtful substitutes such as NTA, such 
rearrangements to reduce or to avoid EDTA use and release tended to happen only 
under favourable circumstances, i.e. in case of machinery replacement intended 
anyhow and/or if they promised to show quick results, did not require long and 
extensive testing periods, and did not affect efficacy. As a consequence, transition 
periods of reducing or phasing out EDTA use tend to last considerably longer than 
the 5 years originally expected in the EDTA declaration. 
13. Because the implementation of formal agreements and regulations typically has to 
occur on site, local water authorities - interacting with local companies - may well 
play a decisive role in realising EDTA reduction goals. As mainly the German states 
have jurisdiction of water regulation, local water authorities have considerable 
margin of interpreting federal rules, particularly if they are non-bindi g declarations 
propagated by UBA. Therefore, on the one hand, companies might in some cases, 
depending on the rigor of administrative instructions by local water authorities, well 
feel subordinated to undue requirements beyond the spirit of the EDTA declaration. 
On the other hand, however, with a soft formulation denominating the obligation to 
reduce the pollutant load after having examined reasonable possibilities individually, 
local water authorities have little chance to interpret such a rule extensively, if the 
company concerned claims the economic unviability of strong EDTA reduction 
requirements or even threatens to close down the plant.19 Thus, interpretation and 
action favourable for EDTA reduction on the local level was and is dependent on 
corresponding attitudes of (local) actors involved and on accompanying 
socioeconomic (market) pressure. 
                                                
17 Already for the beverage sector, for instance, quite some different user groups had to be addressed: 
milk industry, fruit juice producers, mineral water producers, breweries, wine growers. 
18 Significantly, the European amino-carboxylates producers committee, a sector group of CEFIC, 
distributed a leaflet countering UBA's one for food industry with hard criticisms. 
19 Thus, corresponding complaints from both sides were advanced by some interviewees. 
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14. Parallel to ongoing reduction measures in the photochemical industry and after the 
discovery of loopholes in waste water regulations mentioned above, UBA took 
considerable efforts to convince this sector to agree on a separate voluntary 
agreement on additional 30% reduction of EDTA loads until the end of 2000, that 
results from application in the photographic industry. After long negotiations 
concerning mainly its phrasing such a voluntary agreement was signed in January 
1998 by the heads of the associations of the photochemical industry, of wholesale 
photo laboratories, and of professional photo laboratories. Including producers and 
users of photochemicals, the former ones committed themselves to rearrange their 
bleaching and bleach-fix baths in order to reduce their content of not readily 
biodegradable chelating agents in general by 50% relative to 1995. The latter ones 
bound themselves to use the new baths after one year of market introduction or to 
take equivalent means to reduce not readily biodegradable chelating agents 
accordingly, and to deliver their photo baths only to those waste management 
companies whose processing facilities are not expected to release not readily 
biodegradable chelating agents into surface waters. And the photographic industry 
committed itself to undertake appropriate marketing efforts for the new photo baths, 
to provide information about biodegradability and eco-toxicity of EDTA substitutes 
developed and about their amounts used and released, and to identify 
concentrations and loads of chelating agents used in at least three representativ  
large photo laboratories in 1997, 1999 and 2001. As it looks like at present, the 
photographic industry will fulfill its voluntary obligation with some time delay in 2001. 
The main reason for the continuous efforts of the photographic industry to reduce 
EDTA use by applying more expensive substitutes was the perceived long term cost 
impact resulting from the negative image of an environmental polluter by being a 
member of polluting chemical industries. 
15. When gathering and evaluating information about EDTA use and release in 
different sectors and rivers, it became evident that the goal of the EDTA d claration 
to halve EDTA loads in surface waters after around 5 years would not be reached, 
although reductions of EDTA release were certainly observed in Germany, contrary 
to some other EU countries.20 Therefore the EDTA declaration was supplemented 
to prolongate it in order to reach the 50% reduction goal till the end of 2001 and to 
avoid EDTA substitution by other not readily biodegradable chelating agents. This 
amendment was discussed in 1998 and signed by the same and three other institu-
tions (photochemical industry association, IHO, TEGEWA), whereas the LAWA 
continues its support by water measurements without signing, and associations of 
food industry addressed by UBA support but did not sign the amendment because 
of little influence and lacking ecoaccounts of EDTA. The BMU finally subscribed to 
this amendment in September 2000. With the evidence provided at the EDTA 
meeting in 2000, that EDTA loads in surface waters decreased only about 25% in 
1999 compared to 1991/92 and even grew somewhat compared to 1998, it is 
                                                
20 This is mainly due to increased EDTA use in the pulpand paper industry substituting chlorine 
bleaching by peroxide bleaching (see Conrad 2000c). 
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doubtful again, however, if the 50% reduction goal will be reached in 2001, after it 
was already missed in 1996. 
16. One focus of the EDTA policy game is now at the EU level, where the EDTA risk 
assessment has been debated with lobby groups trying to influence its conclusions, 
before it was delivered by UBA as the designated German rapporteur to the EU 
Commission in 2000, and where so-called BREF notes (best available technology 
reference notes) relating to the EU-IPPC directive 96/61, addressing integrated 
pollution prevention and control, influence (national) regulatory policies by 
identifying appropriate technologies preventing environmental pollution. Again, 
industry lobbies are intensely collaborating in order to limit BREF impacts on 
technology requirements. 
Altogether reductions in EDTA use and release achieved in 1999 varied considerably 
according to industrial sector and according to substitutes used, as indicated above in 
section 2. In view of even rising EDTA use in some othercountries and of probably 
much lower reductions achieved by a command-and-control policy approach most 
actors involved in the EDTA policy game evaluate positively its evolution, which results 
from a combination of voluntary declaration, stimulated cooperati n and political 
pressure, in spite of having missed the formal goal of the EDTA declaration. This 
atmosphere of cooperative policy organisation acknowledging differing interests and 
objectives of participating actors allowed agreeing on an amendment of th  EDTA 
declaration without serious problems. With a consensus in principle to further reduce 
EDTA release, consequent and pragmatic action in this direction, including comparative 
assessments of substituting chelating agents, too, is considered more important than 
achieving specified reduction targets, at least by the key promoting actors. 
Taking into account the limited, scientifically based environmental significance of EDTA 
and EDTA releases decreasing anyhow in the 1980s, the annual EDTA meetings and 
the EDTA declaration quite likely induced an eigendynamic21 of continuous efforts to 
reduce EDTA use and emission by at least three overlapping mutually reinforcing 
processes: social learning processes of differentiated understanding and differentiated 
cognitive framing of the EDTA issue; arguing for and defending one's own interests, 
however, in a partly cooperative political setting; and commitment to perform agreed-
upon tasks by all relevant actors involved.22 Without this eigendynamic, introduced with 
the help of environmental policy action, one may well doubt that similar progress in 
reducing EDTA release could and would have been achieved. 
                                                
21 This term means the (social) dynamics induced by the vested interests, sunk costs, and inertia of a 
system, institution, or group, once it has become firmly estab ished and developed its own momentum. 
22 More than one interviewee expressed his concern that he and the association of chemical industries he 
represented actively support the EDTA declaration because of the obligation undertaken although he 
did not consider it justified for scientifically substantiated environmental reasons. 
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3.2 Producers, suppliers, users 
When investigating environmental innovations, it is important to distinguish between 
three groups of economic actors, namely producers, suppliers, as defined in footnote 7, 
and users of EDTA, that may opt for different (technical) solutions toward reducing 
EDTA release. This distinction is important because company and market structures 
differ between these groups, because their possible contributions to reducing EDTA 
release vary, and because the actual (technical and economic) viability of EDTA-related 
environmental innovations to a large degree depends on a cooperative interplay of 
these groups. Thus, EDTA users were largely overlooked during the early EDTA 
discourse. This was recognised as a mistake by its participants when the 
implementation of the EDTA declaration got on the agenda; and it was not by chance 
that UBA in turn approached different user groups individually. 
EDTA producers typically have been large or medium-sized chemical companies, 
capable of producing substitutes, too. In Germany, BASF was the only producer, which 
belonged to the initiating and driving forces of the EDTA meetings and, for reasons 
indicated above, took considerable efforts to reduce its own EDTA emissions and to 
develop and introduce EDTA substitutes on the market. Without BASF's engagement in 
favour of reducing EDTA release the VCI, of which BASF is an important member, 
would hardly have supported the EDTA declaration. After other producers such as 
DOW Europe and Akzo Nobel had entered the German market, too, BASF did not sign 
the amendment of the EDTA declaration as a single company and commissioned 
TEGEWA as an industry association of EDTA producers and suppliers, of which BASF 
is a member, in 1998 with the task to represent EDTA producer concerns on the EDTA 
meetings, though key persons of BASF continued to participate in them as in the past. 
EDTA producers can contribute in principle to all three technical options to reduce 
EDTA release, namely by minimizing EDTA losses in production and waste 
management processes, by degrading EDTA in waste water treatment plants, and by 
developing EDTA substitutes. BASF invested in all three options, including financial 
support of a university project on EDTA biodegradation, which led in the end mainly to 
company internal process optimisation and to market introduction of MGDA. Other 
chemical companies developed other EDTA substitutes and even enforced research on 
biological degradation of EDTA in wastewater treatment plants, too. 
EDTA suppliers, that frequently are large or medium sized companies, can also 
contribute to minimizing EDTA losses by process optimisation when preparing their 
EDTA containing products such as detergents or by omitting or substituting EDTA in 
their product formulations. Corresponding examples are replacement of EDTA by 
PDTA, EDDS, and ADA in photochemical bleaching and bleach-fix baths, avoidance of 
EDTA in household cleaning products, and the development of EDTA-free detergents 
for industry. The market success of such development efforts strongly depends on price 
and a convincing customer relationship because the clients are price sensitive and 
prepared to change their supplier. 
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As indicated above, EDTA users belong to many different industrial sectors and, apart 
from private households, are often small and medium sized companies, who frequently 
did or do not know that they use EDTA in their products. They can contribute to 
reducing EDTA release by rearrangements of their facilities in such a manner that these 
utilise EDTA substitutes, minimize EDTA emissions by process optimisation, or 
eliminate EDTA by physical, chemical or biological decomposition. The specific 
technologies and substitutes appropriate for these purposes vary between areas of 
EDTA use. For example: EDTA is physically eliminated by the handling of the ashes 
resulting from flue gas desulphurisation in the Buschhaus power plant; DTPA was used 
instead of EDTA in bleaching processes of the pulp and paper industry; EDTA is 
avoided or recycled and chemically eliminated in the galvanic industry so that its waste 
water does not contain EDTA any longer, in compliance with annex 40 of the waste 
water administrative regulation issued in 1989; EDTA is less used in cleaning products 
and systems of various beverage industries (breweries, fruit juice, mineral water, milk 
industries) depending on the specific cleaning purpose (bottles, track lubricants, 
membranes etc.); and EDTA has been replaced in various arrangements of MILEI, a 
manufacturer of whey-products, by applying diverse substitutes (NTA, IDS, 
phosphonates) and an enzyme-based cleaning process. 
Altogether these examples indicate that more basic innovations such as substitutes or 
biodegradation systems of EDTA should be expected to occur in chemical industries 
and (bio)chemical engineering R&D institutes, i.e. on the producer side, whereas EDTA 
suppliers and users should take over and implement these (product) innovations by 
(plant-specific) adaptive rearrangements of their producti n and waste management 
installations, which at least partly may well be considered as process innovations. 
3.3 Examples of innovation efforts 
This section summarizes in somewhat more detail five examples of innovation efforts to 
reduce or eliminate EDTA release in surface waters, namely biological degradation on 
a laboratory scale by a university institute of biochemical engineering at Paderborn and 
since 1995 at Braunschweig, process optimisation and substitute development by 
BASF, development and market introduction of the substitute IDS by Bayer, 
development of enzymatic cleaning by Diversey Lever and testing of several cleaning 
systems by MILEI, and development of EDTA substitutes in the photochemical industry. 
3.3.1 EDTA biodegradation by bacteria 
As research projects often originate from chance events and ideas, a university 
scientist who listened to a lecture about EDTA in 1988 questioned the statement of 
biological non-degradability of EDTA. He found out that there exist phylogenetically 
related bacteria in quite different world regions, which are capable to degrade EDTA. 
Apart from interesting questions for basic research the biotechnological potential of this 
discovery was realised and subsequently investigated within this university institute of 
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biochemical engineering. Three subsequent corresponding R&D projects were funded 
by the DFG in 1993-97, by the BMFT in 1994-9623, and by the AIF in 1997-2000. 
Further (parallel) R&D project proposals addressed to the BMBF in 1997 and, together 
with the ESWE institute, to the DBU in 1999 were not funded for different contextual 
reasons. Altogether, several researchers, mainly PhD candidates and students, 
corresponding 2 and later 3 to 4 fulltime equivalents, worked within these projects 
spending around 1 million Euro. The projects were scientifically successful, finding out 
suitable microorganisms and appropriate physico-chemical technologies to biodegrade 
EDTA, contained in wastewaters, in laboratory experiments (Nörtemann 1999).24  
According to the calculations of the research group biodegradation of inexpensive and 
multi-applicable EDTA should therefore be preferred to better degradable, but more 
expensive and often technically less suited EDTA substitutes. Consequently further 
attempts have been made to cooperate with EDTA producers or users in installing a 
pilot or demonstration plant using the EDTA biodegradation technology developed. 
However, according to past impressions of the research group at least, EDTA 
producers wanted to sell their (newly) developed EDTA substitutes instead, and EDTA 
users tended to prefer either continuing operation of existing plants applying EDTA 
without extra investments in waste water treatment or EDTA substitutes rather than 
additional EDTA biodegradation, and therefore showed only limited interest in 
collaborating in a project installing a demonstration plant that biodegrades EDTA. In the 
critical assessment of this long-lasting university project by outside institutions, 
however, this biodegradation technology has not yet demonstrated its technical viability 
at an industrial level or at least in a demonstration plant, and, even if adequately 
installed, appears to be too complicated for practical purposes of waste water 
management by small or medium sized companies. Clearly, the university institute has 
not the resources and marketing capacity of a large chemical company, for instance 
developing EDTA substitutes, in order to successfully introduce a viable EDTA 
biodegradation system on the market on its own. 
3.3.2 Process optimisation and substitute development by the main producer of 
EDTA 
The various efforts of BASF to reduce (its own) EDTA release have already been 
indicated above. It is important to note in this context how the framework conditions and 
BASF's capacity to act crucially influence the viability of the measures undertaken. 
BASF produces EDTA, uses it in its own plants, too, and emits it into wastewater 
because of both operations. In order to reduce internal EDTA release BASF success-
fully undertook considerable efforts mainly by partly substituting internal use of EDTA 
and by process optimisation technologies embedded in a general program to minimize 
emissions. These efforts included improved processing technologies, closed cycle 
arrangements, waste water treatment in a newly built sewage treatment plant, together 
                                                
23 This included funding by the BASF, too.
24 Currently, the research group makes similar attempts to biodegrade DTPA. 
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costing close to 5 million Euro, resulting in a lot of adaptive innovatio s concerning 
processing improvements. No serious efforts to biodegrade EDTA were made. After the 
EDTA declaration in 1991 primarily EDTA release due to its internal use was reduced, 
while EDTA release due to its production was already reduced significantly before. 
Once processing technology optimisation had started, its eigendynamic led to 
continuous reduction efforts in spite of their increasing costs. Apart from this social 
eigendynamic three main strategic orientations of BASF worked together in favour of 
reducing EDTA emissions: recognition of the likely (economic) impact of a loss of the 
chemical industry's credibility without effective implementation of environmental 
management within the corporation; recognition of continuously rising costs of waste 
treatment and disposal in general; and reliance on the development and marketing of 
EDTA substitutes due to the essential technical need for chelating agents. 
Thus, the option of EDTA substitution was strongly pursued by BASF, too, within an 
R&D program to screen appropriate biologically degradable chelating agents25 although 
several newly developed and registered substitutes such as ISDA did not survive on the 
market. In Germany, BASF is the chief producer of many substitutes such as NTA, 
MGDA, DTPA, or PDTA.26 R&D investments in EDTA substitutes amounted to at least 
around 20 million Euro over the last 20 years. Apart from the already well established 
substitutes NTA and DTPA, the newly developed substitute MGDA, a medium-strong 
chelating agent suitable mainly for cleaning purposes has meanwhile started 
penetrating the market quite slowly with sales of still less than 1 ton annually because 
of comparatively high production costs and limited willingness of customers to pay 
higher prices. 
Clearly, the R&D as well as the marketing capacity of BASF together with the just listed 
framework conditions in favour of waste minimization (demand for environm tal 
management, rising waste treatment and disposal costs, existence of and demand for 
EDTA substitutes) make plausible the considerable R&D efforts of BASF and the actual 
realisation of their results by BASF to reduce EDTA release. It has to be recognised, 
however, that BASF’s main reduction strategy aimed at cutting down internal EDTA 
losses and not at lowering EDTA sales figures by changing customer ’ preferences in 
favour of EDTA substitutes. 
3.3.3 Development of the substitute IDS 
IDS is another EDTA substitute for which its producer Bayer sees a high market 
potential. IDS is a medium-strong complexing agent that can replace EDTA in many 
cases where medium-strong chelating agents suffice to achieve the objective to mask 
disturbing metal ions. IDS is biodegradable and has no serious negative environm tal 
                                                
25 Frequently promising substances are not developed further because they require new processing 
technology installations and therefore cannot be produced economically on a large technical scale. 
26 For understandable technical reasons, these substitutes relate to the H-C-N basis of the production 
process profile of BASF. Thus, another substitute IDS, addressed below, would hardly have been 
developed by BASF because it did not fit this profile. 
 21 
impacts; its toxicological, ecotoxicological and mutagenic effects are minimal according 
to present tests. Therefore, IDS has properties superior to other EDTA substitutes such 
as NTA, the use of which is not recommended or even restricted to special applications 
in several countries because of its potential carcinogenic impacts. 
Like the previous BASF example, essentially the situational combination of structural 
driving forces, namely the economic pressure to process a basic chemical, the 
favourable analysis of market chances of alternative new complexing and dispersing 
agents, and existing corporate capacities, was decisive for the successful development 
of IDS. Because Bayer is no producer of EDTA, there was no relevant environmental 
concern and political pressure to reduce EDTA release affecting Bayer, but only the 
market opportunity to develop an economically profitable EDTA substitute. 
In two large plants in the USA lots of maleic acid anhydride (MSA) are produced as a 
basic chemical primarily used as softening agent. In view of low and fluctuating market 
prices it appeared reasonable for Bayer to process this basic chemical inhouse into 
marketable fine chemicals, and thereby to become independent from the business 
cycles of this basic chemical. The relating producti n of complexing and dispersing 
agents seemed to offer a promising option because they hav  a variety of application 
areas. The market analysis looked for deficiencies of chelating agents already sold on 
the market and for the potential interest of customers to change their formulations or 
technical installations depending on rearrangement costs and/or savings due to such 
rearrangements. Typically rearrangements in the production and use of detergents tend 
to require comparatively low investments. 
Because of the competitive advantage resulting from time savings and burden sharing 
of development costs the development of new fine chemicals frequently is arranged by 
sequential agreements, where the customers, being themselves large corporations 
experiment with and develop the technical installations and processes apt for the new 
chemical developed by its producer.27 Within such a sequential agreement underlying 
the development of IDS and PASP as new complexing and dispersing agents the 
cooperating partners allow mutual insight in laboratory documents and promote know-
how transfer. In this case, R&D costs amounted to around 25 million Euro between 
1992 and 1997 for Bayer alone, with about 12 persons from research, technical 
engineering and marketing involved. The customer participating in this sequential 
agreement invested its resources somewhat later. Success of such pilot projects is 
crucial, first because the customer participating in the R&D project reflects upon other 
marketable options of the new chemical, too, which would reduce its logistic expenses 
and enlarge the sales potential of its producer such as Bayer. Second, the proof of the 
suitability of the new chemical by one eminent customer generates a domino effect of 
rising demand that first of all allows profitable production of IDS and PASP. Both 
substantial and adjustment innovations were nc ssary on the producer and the 
supplier side for the development and application of these new chemicals. Compared to 
                                                
27 Because these customers, trading with products containing new chemicals, typically are closer to the 
end user and are exposed to c rresponding market competition, their R&D time horizon and testing 
arrangements tend to be oriented much more short term than Bayer's longer term planning horizon. 
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usual time spans of 10 to 15 years, and taking into consideration the many technical 
problems associated with upscaling production plants, development and market 
introduction of both new chemicals have to be considered as quite rapid and efficient 
ones, apart from some considerable difficulties concerning patenting which had to be 
solved. Although being different types of chemicals, IDS and PASP may well partly 
compete one with each other for similar detergent purposes. 
Furthermore, in parallel with growing production and sales volumes extensive 
toxicological and ecotoxicological studies lasting about three years and costing more 
than half a million Euro are required for the registration of each substance, and are still 
to be completed for higher production levels. IDS was licensed for sale in Europe and in 
the USA in early 1998. In this case, registration in Germany implies registration on the 
EU level.28 Since 1999 IDS (and PASP) are successfully sold in growing amounts, after 
extensive marketing efforts in 1998 to convince potential customers of the advantages 
of the new chemical (see Bayer 1999a, 1999b), although it appears to be still too arly 
to definitely assess market success of IDS. Production capacity will be increased from 
2000 onwards. Despite its focus on the promising market of detergents, IDS can well be 
used for other purposes, too, for instance in cosmetics, though not in the photochemical 
or semiconductor industry. 
Summing up the decisive role of market conditions and chances for IDS development, it 
appears reasonable to conclude, that Bayer, according to its own view, was only willing 
to make these considerable investments - apart from the stimulus to process maleic 
acid anhydride into fine chemicals - because it perceived a good chance for a new 
chelating agent on the global market. In case of an already existing "ideal-type" 
complexing agent and without the environmental problems of EDTA and other 
complexing agents discussed in one way or another in many Western countries29, 
Bayer would not have invested in this R&D project. This kind of R&D investment could 
only be justified economically from a global market perspective, r ferring to OECD 
countries in particular. From this perspective the German EDTA debate was a major 
ingredient, but not of decisive importance for Bayer's corporate strategy.
3.3.4 Avoiding EDTA application in whey processing 
The story of testing enzyme-based cleaning of the installations of the company MILEI, 
which processes whey into protein reach milk products (e.g. yoghurts, fresh cheese, 
baby food) and exports about two thirds of them as one of few special whey producers 
in Western Europe with a turnover of ca. 50 million Euro, illustrates both the importance 
of organisational arrangements and strategic orientations as well as the significance of 
specific technical settings and objectiv s for the technical and economic viability of an 
environmental innovation. 
                                                
28 This does not hold true in the case of eco-efficient fertilizers, described in Conrad 2000b. 
29 In the USA, for instance, the environmental impacts of EDTA or NTA are dealt with in a more 
dispassionate pragmatic attitude, though corresponding research results and international debate are 
well observed. 
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Releasing about 60 tons EDTA in waste water annually, MILEI was the sole major 
emitter on site and therefore was willing to reduce and to avoid EDTA use in time, 
because it was urged by UBA in this respect, was afraid of continuous public criticism, 
and expected a legal ban on EDTA use. Between 1997 and 2000 MILEI pursued 
various projects to do so without public funding even though this was promised to it. 
Cleaning the whey processing facilities, that is required daily according to the German 
food act, is a rather complex multi-step process of dissolving organic and inorganic 
components, which stick to different parts of the whey processing plant, by surface 
active agents, acid and alkaline baths, and chelating agents, lasting about 4 hours. In 
particular, cleaning of the ultrafiltration membranes used to percolate whey proteins is 
difficult because of the risk to destruct them when dissolving adsorbing materials. The 
various EDTA reduction projects undertaken by MILEI are summarized subsequently. 
1. In early 1997 MILEI reduced EDTA applied in the cleaning process and added soda 
lye to the detergent in order to reduce EDTA release by 30%. 
2. MILEI tried NTA as a substitute in April 1997 reducing EDTA use by 50%. This 
attempt was abandoned because of insufficient l aning results leading to a 
decrease in the microbiological quality of products. 
3. In parallel, the EDTA containing cleansing solution was separated into a storage 
tank and concentrated by nanofiltration for subsequent waste disposal or 
reprocessing. Corresponding tests in a pilot plant proved to be unsatisfactory so 
that this approach was not continued further. 
4. After initial consultation with the above mentioned university institute at Braun-
schweig, EDTA release was reduced by biological degradation in a pilot plant in 
1997, which was built by IMD Micon, presumably a joint subsidiary of DiverseyLever 
and Akzo Nobel. The technical results of this experiment were reasonable, but 
MILEI did not pursue this option further because of the considerable additional 
costs of a subsequent degradation process, which does not avoid EDTA application 
itself. 
5. Still in 1997, MILEI considered to use MGDA as a complete substitute of EDTA in 
case other options would fail, but did not yet enter in serious testing experiments. 
6. An enzyme-based procedure with changes in detergents, formulation, and 
processing technology developed by DiverseyLever, a subsidiary of Unilever, was 
tried in the main plant for 1,5 years in 1998/99, which substituted chlorine for 
dissolving organic materials and permitted to substitute EDTA by IDS for dissolving 
inorganic materials. However, because of supposedly too effective cleaning 
impeding the formation of the secondary membrane coating layer needed for 
protein filtration, which still reoccurred aft r replacing the membranes by new ones, 
MILEI did not pursue this option further for about half a year.
7. In 1999 MILEI replaced it by a similar enzyme-bas d procedure combined with 
phosphonates as chelating agents, developed by Henkel Ecolab, after having tested 
this alternative procedure in a pilot plant in 1998 already. Again, in this (ongoing) 
experiment, EDTA was no longer used. However, the particular well known 
difficulties with removing calcium compounds, primarily calcium phosphate, again 
led to bacterial contamination, reduced cleaning performance, and thereby lowered 
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production performance in continuous operation. Therefore MILEI now pursues a 
strategy to insert an EDTA-based cleaning step a few times a month in addition to 
the daily enzyme-based procedure, where it uses both systems provided by 
DiverseyLever and Henkel Ecolab in each half of its installations in order to avoid 
dependency from only one supplier. 
Altogether, MILEI spent close to 50.000 Euro, particularly for the nanofiltration plant, 
and a lot of manpower for testing the various options was needed, too, implying 
additional personnel costs. The investment costs of the different (pilot) projects were 
borne by their respective suppliers that could see them as necessary testing facilities 
and as marketing costs because they were interested in selling the corresponding 
detergents to MILEI and other potential customers on a permanent basis. 
Looking at one of these projects from the supplier perspective, one should note that 
DiverseyLever at first was less ready to invest in enzyme-bas d cleaning systems than 
its competitor Henkel Ecolab30 ecause of publicly associated health risks. Then the 
corresponding R&D project was performed within just about half a year as a fast 
response to competitive pressure urged by the customers, and as a medium term R&D 
strategy of Unilever to realise potential market options in enzyme-based chemistry. A 
major task in this respect is the coordination and mutual fit of these two R&D strategies 
pursued in Unilever's international research enters and in national research units. 
They mainly lead to less expensive application oriented innovations (in this case about 
0,5 million Euro) which can be implemented rapidly, whereas the more long term and 
more broadly oriented R&D of enzymatic systems may lead to more basic innovations 
but requires much higher investments, too. Once started, such R&D projects generate a 
company-internal eigendynamic, depending on the engagement of their promoters, a 
clear perspective on the problem addressed and its solution, and effective internal 
communication. Typically, these innovations are optimising processes of a cleaning 
system as a whole and do not just imply the screening and testing of an enzyme. A 
well-functioning interplay of development, marketing and sales units is crucial for the 
success of these innovations, because the "truth" of the superiority of a new product 
strongly depends on its price and its presentation by sales representatives. 
Concerning successful implementation of ew cleaning systems, the market power of 
its customers via changing the supplier prevents high profit margins, on the one hand, 
and large investments in new technical installations, apart from anyway pending 
replacements, on the other hand. Furthermore, users want to see quick results of newly 
installed systems and are therefore badly prepared for long lasting precise testing 
experiments and possible costly system improvements. Finally, viable innovative 
arrangements may not work in other settings. Because of the peculiar raw material 
whey of MILEI its cleaning arrangements cannot be simply utilised in other factories of 
the milk industry. Thus, technically well viable innovations such as enzyme-based 
                                                
30 Henkel engaged in enzyme-based systems earlier in the USA and was interested in exporting them 
into EU countries and, for this purpose, pursued a clever combined R&D and marketing strategy. 
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cleaning procedures may have severe difficulties to succeed on the market, as 
demonstrated by the MILEI example. 
3.3.5 Reduction of EDTA release in the photographic industry 
Since the 1990s the photographic industry has already been testing and using the 
EDTA substitutes PDTA and ADA in bleach baths. PDTA, which is produced by for 
instance Akzo Nobel and BASF in Europe, is only needed in photochemical baths about 
half the amount of EDTA needed, but is more expensive than EDTA. One reason for 
this is the small production volume of PDTA. It is also not readily biodegradabl  and is 
intended to be applied to bleach baths. These bleach baths contain about 15% of all 
complexing agents in photographic laboratories. 
ADA is a medium-strong complexing agent developed by Agfa, a former subsidiary of 
Bayer, and is used by Agfa-supplied laboratories in bleaching solutions. But users had 
to pay more and were confronted with problems of technical quality such as germ 
formation. ADA is developed further so that its use in bleach-fix baths can be expected, 
too, increasing its up till now low acceptance on the market. 
All the big companies, such as Agfa, Fuji and Kodak, are global players on the photo-
chemical market.31 For understandable economic reasons they try to create a product 
that will be useful worldwide or at least European-wide and not only in Germany. As a 
consequence, German subsidiaries understandably had problems to convince their 
(Japanese or American) headquarters Fuji or Kodak to make investment  in developing 
substitutes for reducing EDTA release, favourable just for the German and, possibly, 
the Swedish market. 
The German market for photographic films and photochemical baths is characterized by 
fierce competition. Therefore there are economic problems in developing photo-
chemical baths with new easy-degradable complexing agents. To develop EDTA 
substitutes only for the German market is very expensive. A decision on one basic 
chemical would have favoured one company over the others, because this company 
already had the chance to improve its product line on this substance in the past,32 
especially after Agfa had decided to follow its own product line with ADA. Therefore 
there was little interest in joint development efforts towards photochemical baths with 
new better biodegradable complexing agents to fulfill the voluntary agreement of the 
photographic industry, although an agreement on one basic chemical would have saved 
development costs for all companies. 
There are three biodegradable EDTA substitutes for the development of film negatives 
and photo prints in bleach baths on the market, which have been developed by Agfa, 
Fuji and Kodak.33 
                                                
31 Only Tetenal remained as a relevant German supplier of photochemical baths for mini-lab atories. 
32 Just four firms own most of the about 60 wholesale photographic laboratories in Germany, with Fuji 
providing about two thirds of all photochemical baths for two of these firms. 
33 Meanwhile these EDTA substitutes are partly used in wholesale laboratories, though not yet replacing 
EDTA in all types of photographic processing. The resulting different, somewhat more expensive 
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Agfa developed the EDTA substitute ADA and is making field tests with bleach-fix baths 
now. After Associated Octel had in principle developed the EDTA substitute EDDS over 
about the past 10 years, Fuji, Kodak and Konica put a lot of effort into its further 
development in order to adapt it to their various specific formulations of bleach-fix
baths.34 The corresponding R&D costs arise in the central research laboratories of the 
large photographic companies, which are mainly not in Germany. These costs amount 
to around half a million Euro, including (future) registration costs of about 150.000 Euro 
because the ferric complex of EDDS is a new chemical. These figures do not include 
the major R&D costs of Associated Octel, who is the sole producer of EDDS till now. 
The R&D costs for EDDS are very high compared to the annual sales of EDDS to 
photographic laboratories in Germany, amounting to about 1,5 million Euro. 
EDDS is an isomer of EDTA and a well biodegradable complexing agent with low 
toxicity. Therefore it seems to be an appropriate substitute for EDTA with many areas of 
application, but it is much more expensive. Because there is little margin for a price 
increase of photochemical baths for photofinishers, the sole use of EDDS in bleach-fix 
baths would be very expensive. Therefore only mixtures containing EDTA and EDDS 
currently appear to be marketable in order to fulfill the voluntary self-obligation of the 
photographic industry.35 
Thus, today many efforts are put into the improvement of already existing formulations 
and processing technologies, including waste management options of evaporation, 
burning or resale of recovered photochemical baths for further use.36 Wa tewater 
treatment can be done by precipitating heavy metals. The ammonia containing rest can 
be sold to the cement industry for the application in flue gas scrubbers for denitrifica-
tion.37 In contrast to these waste management options, developing and testing substi-
tutes is one essential, but only one option to reduce environmental pollution. 
As environmental criticism can have a negative influence on the image of the photo-
graphic industry, it follows a general direction to avoid that already for economic 
reasons. Therefore there is a genuine interest of the photographic industry to agree on 
one EDTA substitute. Such a consensus, however, requires at least the following three 
preconditions: agreement on one qualified substance; solution of the patent-law 
problem and of know-how transfer; and limited purchase price of the EDTA substitute 
for the sole producer. 
Apart from the development of EDTA substitutes, Agfa and Gretag, a Swiss manu-
facturer of photo laboratory installations, offer new types of paper processors, which 
save a lot of water (90%), energy, chemicals and space. Although the substitution of 
                                                                                                                                                            
bleach baths are mutually compatible so that a photographic laboratory can change its bath without 
problems. 
34 Major emphasis is put on EDDS because several corporations are involved in its development and 
case-specific application and hold respective patents, whereas development of ADA is essentially 
pursued by Agfa. 
35 Market introduction of EDDS-containing formulations for photochemical baths is expected in late 2000. 
36 Therefore corresponding innovations again are mainly due to optimisation processes. 
37 This waste management strategy of photochemical baths supplanted burning or evaporation strategies 
during the last two years because it is now cheaper, too. 
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existing equipment by this new machinery will last quite some years in spite of the high 
savings implied, wholesale photographic laboratories in this case have no reason to 
substitute EDTA by much more expensive EDDS for environmental reasons. Another 
possibility to reduce EDTA release would be a closed photographic processing system 
with a low EDTA carry-over that already permits compliance with the voluntary self-
obligation of the photographic industry. As a consequ nce, the (economic) viability as 
well as the (relative) environmental favourability of the EDTA substitutes EDDS or ADA 
in bleach-fix baths of the photographic industry still remain an open question. 
The currently ongoing market penetration of digital photography and computer-
generated pictures may have even more profound consequences in case of replacing 
photochemical processing by direct printout that is associated with quite different 
environmental impacts to be dealt with in the future. 
4 Actors and networks 
The actors involved in the case investigated can be defined at two levels: organisati ns 
and individuals. Because the various individuals in principle acted according to the rules 
and interests of their organisational units, it appears sufficient to analyse actor 
behaviour and constellation at the level of organisational units, although this does not 
deny the key role of certain individuals for the specific development path of the case 
history, for example the minister al director of the BMU organising and phrasing the 
EDTA declaration. Because the various bargaining and innovation processes are 
reconstructed at a summary level only and not in substantive detail, it is usually 
satisfactory to conceive of macro-organisations such as BASF, BMU or UBA as 
essential actors, although typically organisational sub-units within a macro-organisation 
such as the R&D or marketing department or the responsible administrative unit are the 
true organisational actors with on average 5 to 15 individuals belonging to this unit. 
4.1 Differing actor interests, perceptions, and strategies 
Because of the manifold areas of EDTA application the related overall actor 
constellation, largely reflected in the annual EDTA meetings, is likely to be a si uational 
and temporary one, where many special (loose) networks overlap and the actors have 
only occasional contact if they do not belong to the same area, for instance to the 
photographic industry. As a consequence, overall EDTA reduction and substitution, as 
a goal agreed upon by most actors later on and as the focal point of this case study, 
result from the relating (mutually interacting) activities of many actors in different 
networks, but cannot be controlled by one or few key actors. For well-defined specific 
sectors joint strategic action is feasible though only to a limited degree, as illustrated by 
the differing interests and perceptions of EDTA producers, suppliers, and users. 
The actors involved in (or concerned by) EDTA reduction strategies can b  divided into 
the following groups: federal politico-administrative actors, namely BMU, BMFT/BMBF, 
BMG, BMWi, LAWA, UBA, BgVV, BUA, and PTWT, state and local water authorities, 
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EU (Commission) bodies, water utilities and their industrial associations (BGW, DVGW) 
and research units (e.g. TZW, ESWE), (academic) water and chemistry related 
research institutes (e.g. at the TU Braunschweig), producers of EDTA and its 
substitutes, particularly BASF, Bayer, and Akzo Nobel, and their industrial associations, 
EDTA formulators/suppliers, such as DiverseyLever, Henkel Ecolab, Agfa, Fuji, and 
Kodak, and their industrial associations, EDTA users belonging to many different 
industry sectors, for example detergents and cleaning products, photo, textiles, pulp 
and paper, metal treatment, or galvanic breweries, food, beverage, chemicals, 
cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals. 
As described above, key actors in EDTA discourse and policy making were the BMU, 
UBA, water utility groups (ARW, AWWR) and associations (BGW, DVGW), BASF, VCI, 
and industry sector associations (e.g. photochemical industry, IHO) who were of deci-
sive importance for defining, organising and monitoring EDTA reduction arrangements. 
In general, all actors largely acted according to their interest, problem perception and 
strategic orientation, frequently combining a clever use of existing economic and 
political framework conditions (e.g. window of opportunity for EDTA substitutes, 
improbability of an EDTA ban, interpretation of environmental regulations), the 
willingness to come to and to cooperate in voluntary agreements considered acceptable 
and viable, and the commitment to fulfill such an agreement, once signed, inducing a 
quite remarkable eigendynamic. In this context, the following superimposing features 
can explain the actual reduction of EDTA release achieved: 
1. Despite quite differing interests, problem perceptions and strategic orientations of 
the various actors there was still some common core knowledge and problem 
perspective allowing for compromising declarations and agreements.38 
2. Certainly, actor interests partly were in opposition to each other, but could be 
reconciled to some degree without jeopardizing the very basis of their proponents 
and because of the partially shared view that environmental concern is an at least 
legitimate social concern. 
3. The corresponding overall sociocultural and sociopolitical background of serious 
environmental concern and the related threat of being (anew) publicly attacked for 
insufficient environmental protection action, leading to serious undesired economic 
or political impacts, helped to prepare the ground for committing oneself to EDTA 
reduction efforts, especially if undertaken by other parties concerned as well. 
4. Furthermore, interests and strategies of individual actors tended o be multiple and 
not uniform ones so that partially they were well in conformity with those of other 
actors, for instance marketing of newly developed EDTA substitutes by BASF as an 
EDTA producer and avoidance of EDTA release by environmental policy. 
5. The procedural arrangements pursued by environmental policy actors, i.e. EDTA 
meetings (with agreed upon monitoring duties etc.) and voluntary arrangements, 
permitted all (participating) actors to stick to their interests, perceptions and 
                                                
38 Thus, the validity of the Thomas theorem does not contradict agreement on common general 
objectives. 
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strategies, considered as legitimate ones, on the one hand, and induced to some 
degree a cooperation-oriented social learning process opening up viable paths of 
EDTA reduction efforts, on the other hand. 
6. Once actors had committed themselves, an eigendynamic was created in f vour of 
continuous efforts, and their positive results facilitated to convince other relevant 
actors, such as EDTA users, to take part in corresponding efforts, too. 
These general abstract theses are substantiated by few following examples. 
Water utilities were strictly opposed to find anthropogenic, not readily biodegradable 
substances such as EDTA in surface waters because their elimination in water 
treatment plants requires additional investments and its appearance in drinking water 
threatens the image of pure healthy water provided for the population. In their 
perception EDTA is an at least potentially hazardous substance (e.g. by transporting or 
remobilising heavy metals). Because a legal ban of EDTA could not be achieved, a 
strategy to support the EDTA declaration, aspiring to halve EDTA release, to observe 
and to monitor EDTA concentrations in surface and drinking water, and not to engage 
rapidly in EDTA elimination technologies in water treatment plants, appears a quite 
reasonable one for water utilities. 
Being in charge of investigating, monitoring and administrating environmental problems 
and corresponding problem solutions, UBA is interested in contributing practical 
organisational (and also financial) support in order to reduce and replace EDTA 
application, because it perceives EDTA as a not readily biodegradable and 
environmentally potentially hazardous substance. Because according to its view 
industries typically were not keen on avoiding environmental pollution, environmental 
policy should try to regulate and control polluting industrial activities as strictly as 
possible. Therefore emission oriented environmental regulations should be favoured 
over those aiming at ambient environmental quality control. Consequently, UBA was 
first opposed to a voluntary EDTA declaration, put considerable emphasis on 
monitoring activities, approached various EDTA using industries directly in order to 
convince them to take EDTA reduction measures, and emphasized the use of 
biodegradable EDTA substitutes, in particular, although their environmental or health 
impacts might not be sufficiently known, either. 
BASF is interested in continuous profitable business without recurrent conflicts with 
water utilities and without cost inducing bureaucratic environmental regulations. 
Perceiving EDTA as not particularly ecologically dangerous, but understanding concern 
of water utilities on this matter, the strategy of BASF appears a quite reasonable one, 
namely to reduce EDTA release into the Rhine river by an already ongoing waste 
minimization program, thereby lowering in the long term anyhow rising charges on 
waste emissions, to better sell produced and recovered EDTA to customers instead to 
partly release it into waste water, and to replace EDTA by substitutes also producedby 
BASF. 
The IHO represents mainly medium and small sized companies providing cleaning 
products and detergents for professional use. This sector is a significant formulator for 
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and major supplier of EDTA, though less an emitter of it. The IHO is an actor that 
became involved in EDTA discourse and politics only since the mid 1990s, when EDTA 
users were addressed by environmental policy. As a member of the VCI, which had 
signed the EDTA declaration, the IHO felt obliged to contribute to achieving the 
declaration's objectives. The IHO had no genuine interest in reducing EDTA use 
because it did not perceive EDTA as an environmentally dangerous substance; a 
perception further reinforced by inconsistent propositions of public environmental and 
health authorities. Once being involved in the EDTA declaration and meetings,39 the 
responsible IHO representatives felt committed to their task to persuade its members to 
substitute EDTA by better biodegradable chelating agents such as NTA in those 
applications, where the sub titution was possible without losing efficacy. Thus, the IHO 
understandably followed a (mixed) strategy: pointing to the availability of only 
persuasive instruments when doing its job of achieving reduction of EDTA release by its 
members; insisting vis-à-vis environmental policy actors on the need to differentiate 
between areas in which EDTA can be replaced and where it cannot (yet), to strengthen 
its position as an industrial association by incorporating its members and defending 
them against outside criticism, and to propagate an image of environmental orientation 
and environmental management activities of and for its members. Although the IHO has 
in principle no objection against reducing EDTA release (if technically and economically 
feasible) and signed the amendment to the EDTA declaration in 2000, it doubts 
whether activities of this kind are reasonable at the national level at all, not to mention 
the European context. Thus, it is doubtful in hindsight whether the IHO would join the 
EDTA declaration once more with the knowledge gained and experiences made so far 
and without the strong personal engagement of its first representative responsible for 
managing the EDTA declaration. 
4.2 Regulatory, business and knowledge networks 
Studying networks around environmental innovations, it is important to (analytically) 
distinguish regulatory, business and knowledge networks which typically follow different 
tasks and consist of different actors (van Dijken et al. 1999). In the EDTA case in 
particular, where the participating actors belong to just one and only occasionally to 
more than one out of many overlapping loose networks, one can clearly discern the 
sector-specific differentiation of actor groups concerned with business, with research 
and development, and with environmental regulation, though they certainly keep 
themselves informed about and interact with each other. It has been mainly the annual 
EDTA meetings, which symbolically unite all the various networks by offering a 
cognitive and organisational frame of comm n discourse. 
Significantly, policy was not strongly involved in funding corresponding R&D projects for 
reasons indicated above in section 3. Therefore, R&D projects typically were performed 
within EDTA-related corporations and thus strongly influenced by conomic objectives, 
whereas policy objectives tended to stimulate such projects by the framework 
                                                
39 That largely happened without previous careful examination of the likely impacts of this engagement. 
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conditions set by environmental regulations, the EDTA declaration, and subsequent 
voluntary agreements, without being involved, however, in their (scientifc) details. This 
kind of direct involvement happened by the cooperation of suppliers and users, or of 
producers and formulators of chelating agents if both sides contributed to experiments 
and innovative arrangements to reduce EDTA release. Typically, the research 
addressing EDTA substitutes was done on a continuous basis in view of (eventual) 
environmental policy regulations but without straightforward reaction to specific political 
decisions. This awareness of business concerning possible environmental regulations 
influences - apart from lobbying efforts in favour of business positions - business 
strategies, which in turn influence corporate R&D strategies. Similarly, business 
activities and innovations recognised by policy makers in turn influence policy 
strategies. But beyond these mutual (indirect) influences, the three types of networks 
tend to evolve according to their own rules and strategies followed by their affiliated 
actors, as indicated subsequently. 
In the regulatory networks the politico-administrative actors at the federal level such as 
BMU, UBA, BgVV, LAWA were concerned particularly with 
– coordinating various environmental regulations40 among each other and with other 
regulations, especially those of health and economic policy, 
– advancing as well as harmonizing specific policy strategies preferred by different 
environmental policy actors (e.g. control of emissions versus control of ambient 
environmental quality in EDTA policy), 
– reconciling federal policy with regulatory activities on the EU, state and local level, 
– bargaining with relevant interest groups, mainly from business, 
– deciding if certain environmental regulations should be passed or not, 
– assessing who has to bear which type of costs resulting from environmental 
regulations and associated monitoring systems, 
– acquiring relevant technical and business information, 
– (possibly) commissioning EDTA-related investigations, 
– monitoring and controlling EDTA-related activities and emissions, 
– getting informed about as well as evaluating and comparing ( robable) environ-
mental impacts of alternatives to EDTA application, 
– organising relevant communication and agreements via EDTA meetings and 
working groups, 
– and maintaining the overall EDTA reduction strategy pursued. 
The other actors in the federal regulatory network have been mainly business corpora-
tions and associations, i.e. EDTA producers, suppliers, users, and water utilities, 
lobbying for their interests, whereas environmental or consumer groups have been at 
best indirectly involved by generating public debate and criticism with the help of the 
media. 
                                                
40 Apart from the EDTA declaration EDTA is addressed for instance in the following regulations in 
Germany: ordinances regulating hazardous substances, food additives, water hazard ratings, waste 
management, waste water with various amendments (BUA 1995:175ff). 
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At the state and the municipal level environmental ministries and water authorities are 
the significant politico-administrative actors in the regulatory networks dealing with 
monitoring, regulating, implementing, negotiating and coordinating activities in 
confrontation and/or cooperation with corporate economic actors, especially those 
belonging to the same industrial sectors mentioned above.
Finally, environmental risk assessments and regulations with frequently far reaching 
long term impacts on national and local regulatory settings are done and issued in 
regulatory networks at the EU level, where especially industries as well as national and 
state authorities try to influence administrative bodies of th  EU Commission according 
to their propositions and interests, as illustrated by the EU risk assessment on EDTA or 
the BREF notes referring to the EU-IPPC directive 96/61 mentioned above. 
The business networks concerned with EDTA-related environmental innovations mainly 
consist of corporate planning, marketing and R&D units including top management 
which evaluate the chances and costs of certain strategies to reduce or substitute 
EDTA production or use in view of general corporate strategies and framework 
conditions, such as availability of competitive options, investments in processing plants, 
in any case occurring raw materials, (expected) environmental criticism and protest, or 
an orientation towards responsible care. Corresponding decisions taken in th se 
business networks also imply decisions on the start or stop of an R&D project, and on 
corporate policy strategies concerning the respective industrial association and 
environmental policy actors. The business networks may - in case of joint ventures - 
simply actors from more than one enterprise, but rarely actors from outside the 
economic sphere. 
The knowledge networks are those directly concerned with developing substantial 
(EDTA-related) environmental innovations. They primarily consist of corporate R&D 
units and private or public research institutes, possibly supplemented by other 
cooperating business units (e.g. production, marketing, quality control), responsible 
research project management bodies funding the project, and competent segments of 
the professional engineering or scientific community. One should note that only a few of 
these enumerated actors may constitute an individual knowledge network. As indicated 
by the innovation efforts described above in section 3.3, cooperation on the R&D level
played some role, but rarely more than two or three R&D units were engaged in a 
specific EDTA-related project. It is largely within the knowledge network that the 
technical viability of an environmental innovation is decided upon, whereas its economic 
viability is in the last analysis judged by the business network and the market. 
Examples described above illustrate these features of knowledge networks, for instance 
biodegradation of EDTA by bacteria, development of IDS as EDTA substitute, or 
MILEI's experiments with different options to reduce EDTA use and release. 
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4.3 The role of environmental policy actors 
Looking finally at the role of environmental and technology policy actors in EDTA-
related politics and environmental R&D, one may reasonably draw several conclusions. 
Concerning ETP, the responsible research project management body PTWT was kept 
informed about EDTA issues and participated in the EDTA meetings, but was not 
significantly engaged in EDTA politics and R&D, apart from funding one project of the 
university institute of biochemical engineering described above. Since the BMFT 
contributed to funding the joint project on NTA in the late 1980s mentioned above, a 
similar joint project on EDTA was discussed as well, but not funded, mainly because 
the BMFT saw no reason to co-fund EDTA-related development efforts of industry as 
long as corresponding regulatory objectives remained unclear and EDTA use or release 
was not prohibited in general. Whereas till to the EDTA declaration in 1991 the BMU 
was the key EP actor concerned with environmental regulations addressing EDTA, that 
preferred for reasons described above an agreement on the voluntary EDTA 
declaration and successfully launched annual EDTA meetings, since 1992 UBA 
became the central organising actor oncerned with both EP and ETP. By learning the 
need to carefully differentiate between differing areas of EDTA use implying different 
technological conditions and ecological impacts, and to weigh the (environmental and 
economic) pros and cons of EDTA sub titutes, UBA gained growing acceptance by 
industrial actors participating in the EDTA meetings. Pursuing EP objectives, UBA 
engaged in implementing the EDTA declaration by approaching different EDTA using 
industries, by monitoring EDTA effluent data, by propagating reasons for and 
possibilities of reducing EDTA release, and by threatening with formal environmental 
regulations in case of a lack of corresponding progress. UBA was also the main ETP 
actor in spite of lacking resources, as it observed and compiled EDTA-related R&D 
projects, cared for measurement programs of state water authorities and water utilities 
monitoring EDTA release in surface waters, and offered funding of few R&D projects. 
Again, neither EDTA-related EP nor ETP were managed by one major actor, and UBA 
as a key actor without any jurisdiction over federal, state or local authorities could only 
try to coordinate these policies as far as possible, as indicated in the previous section, 
but not prevent well occurring inconsistencies between diff rent policies, such as 
chemical, water, health, and economic policy, or between different (federal, state, 
municipal) levels of policy making. 
5 Innovative solutions to an environmental problem? 
In view of the general objective of this case study (see IIUW 1998) this section asks 
about the ecological quality of EDTA-related environmental innovations, indicates the 
crucial role of economic factors for their success, and discusses the impact of political 
action and environmental regulation upon them.
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5.1 The crucial significance of cognitive framing 
Formally, an environmental innovation is a (fundamental or incremental, technical or 
social) innovation improving the status of the environment if applied. It is not required 
that the positive environmental effect is an intentional purpose of the innovative 
process. However, evaluating the ecological value of an innovation, such as the type 
and range of environmental improvements, depends on many aspects such as 
1. the relative weighting of various, possibly opposing dimensions of environmental 
protection (e.g. air versus water pollution, substitution versus degradation of a 
hazardous substance), 
2. new (unknown) environmental impacts, particularly those due to physical interaction 
processes between the innovative product or process and the environment, 
3. the social implementability and resulting viability of the (environmental) innova ion,
4. its time horizon for substantial environmental improvements to be achieved,
5. its comparison with the status quo ante and with other (competing) environmental 
innovations, 
6. and the overall social strategy (implicitly) preferred to achieve environmental 
compatibility or even ecological sustainability (e.g. efficiency, sufficiency and 
consistency strategies; Huber 1995).41 
Now, if perceptions of and opinions on an innovation differ with respect to these eco-
logical evaluation criteria, disagreement on its ecological value and advantages is most 
likely. Therefore the cognitive framing of an (environmental) issue plays a crucial role. 
As indicated in section 3.1, there was no substantive agreement among the actors 
involved on the ecological urgency and need to reduce EDTA release into surface 
waters. Given the admittedly relatively minor environmental and health impacts of 
EDTA, EDTA-related industries could - independent of existing disagreements on 
(scientifically investigated) environmental facts - rea onably argue that substitution of 
EDTA by other better biodegradable, but more expensive chelating agents with partially 
still unknown environmental impacts was a doubtful strategy to protect the environment. 
The various dependencies listed of such an evaluation are illustrated each by one or 
two examples subsequently, though the impact of cognitive framing on the ecological 
evaluation of EDTA release and relevant reduction technologies is not elaborated in 
detail for all the different actors. 
Evaluating EDTA as an environmental hazard becomes likely, if one values high its 
anthropogenic origin and slow biodegradability and is aware of connected risks such as 
the transportation of chelated heavy metals, the potential remobilisation of heavy 
metals, synergetic effects with other substances, potential teratogenic and genotoxic 
                                                
41 Furthermore, because environmental innovations typically occur in companies, environmental 
protection is only one out of many innovation goals of a company within its overall innovation 
processes, within which the weight of environmental protection goals and their complementarity or 
competition with other innovation goals determine its role and importance. Thus, the more integrated 
environmental protection measures are, the less can environmental innovations be isolated from 
'normal' innovations. 
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effects, and eventual other unknown impacts, as done by UBA. If on relies, however, on 
studies indicating the negligibility of those effects under usual conditions, one will not 
consider EDTA as a real environmental hazard, as stated by EDTA-related industries. 
IDS as a suitable and, compared to other biodegradable substitutes, inexpensive me-
dium-strong chelating agent appears to have no serious toxicological, eco-toxicological 
or other environmental impacts. However, this assessment may still change in case of 
unsatisfactory results of the main health and environmental impact study that the 
chemical act requires for further licensing. Similarly, the eventual detection of environ-
mentally dangerous metabolites resulting from biodegradation of chelating agents in 
surface waters may invalidate their presupposed environmental compatibility, too.42 
EDDS appears to be a very suitable and environmentally benign substitute of EDTA, 
especially for photo baths, but it is several times more expensive than EDTA. Because 
wholesale photo laboratories (and the public as their client) are not willing to pay double 
or triple prize, at present EDDS is only marketed as a bath mixture together with EDTA. 
If the new types of photo processing machinery, that greatly economize use of water, 
energy and chemicals savings, in addition allow sale of processed waste to the cement 
industry, which (implicitly) cares for the environmentally sound disposal of EDTA, too, 
there is little ecological reason to renounce cheap EDTA application in the longer run by 
gradual replacement of existing machinery in German photo laboratories. Only because 
of the voluntary agreement of the photographic industry to cut back EDTA release by 
one more third until 2001, ADA and EDDS are offered as EDTA substitutes on the 
market now. 
The ambiguity of recommendations to substitute EDTA by NTA and the compromise 
reached between UBA and BgVV, advising to do so without serious increase of NTA 
application, reflect the trade-off between better biodegradability and potential health 
risks of NTA. 
If EDTA can be biodegraded well and cheaply by bacteria in additional (sophisticated) 
water treatment plants after use, and if EDTA use can be avoided by environmentally 
unrisky, but expensive substitutes, and if EDTA can be disposed of by further use of 
EDTA containing reprocessed wastes in another industry without serious environmental 
hazards, then no unequivocal answer can be given which option should be preferred on 
environmental grounds. 
Essentially all options followed to reduce EDTA release are technical-fix solutions, 
which, however, require appropriate social settings, too. As long as one prefers the 
chemotechnical advantages of applying chelating agents in a modern society, one may 
only give preference to environmentally less hazardous, though possibly more costly 
technical-fix solutions for ecological reasons, but there exists no realistic option to 
renounce them altogether because of their (potential) environmental or health impacts. 
If one would prefer, however, a less technology based and thus less vulnerable society, 
one could well imagine of social rearrangements allowing to abandon the use of 
                                                
42 This risk was pointed out by detecting oxopiperazine polycarboxylic acids as metabolites of DTPA and 
EDTA (Ternes et al. 1996). 
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(strong) chelating agents, except perhaps for special processes, where product quali-
ties may be somewhat lower in certain aspects but considered acceptable because of 
the (potential) environmental burden avoided. Unlike the hazardous potential of nuclear 
power, which is judged as socially unacceptable by large segments of the population, 
including many experts, such a phasing out of widely applicable chelating agents, 
however, is unlikely to be seriously considered by relevant social groups at present. 
Referring once more to the example of new types of photographic processing machin-
ery implying a lot of water, energy and chemicals savings, it is obvious that EDTA sub-
stitution is only of secondary importance for the general goal to reduce or prevent envi-
ronmental pollution, as long as EDTA is not considered a serious environmental threat. 
In many cases there exist more effective opportunities for environmental management 
to reduce environmental pollution by corresponding environmental innovations than by 
substituting EDTA. Therefore, the innovative efforts taken to reduce EDTA release, for 
instance substitution by IDS and EDDS, EDTA biodegradation, or safe waste disposal 
by reusing EDTA containing wastes, finally resulting in EDTA degradation, may well be 
considered true environmental innovations if they imply favourable ecoaccounts 
compared to EDTA use or release. However, their costs should remain limited, when 
one compares their benefits with oter, possibly more significant non EDTA-related 
environmental innovations, which might well be achieved by the same actors. 
5.2 The central role of market opportunities and corporate capacities 
Comparing the various innovative efforts undertaken to reduce EDTA use or release, 
their successful diffusion exhibits some features which tend to confirm the familiar 
hypothesis that - given equal technical viability of innovations addressing similar 
objectives - corporate capacities and market opportunities to a large degree decide 
about their success on the market. Although technical maturity and reliability of the 
various innovations clearly differed and mattered, and although equality in technical 
viability can never be assessed precisely, the examples tend to support this hypothesis. 
Besides further significant criteria such as safety for producers, users and third parties, 
and relative advantages in cost, the range of possible applications (market volume), 
and the power of promoters and implementers of an (environmental) innovation clearly 
matter. 
In this respect the interesting comparison is biodegradation of EDTA by bacteria 
developed by a university institute with small resources and no market power and 
access, dependent on the support of cooperating institutions43, on the one hand, and 
the development and marketing of the medium-strong chelating agent MGDA by BASF, 
on the other hand. Thus, the university research group has no real opportunity t  
launch, upscale and test its technology even with a highly competitive rice on the 
market, until EDTA users are willing to cooperate and to experiment with this technol-
ogy. Past experience, however, of the research group was rather disappointng 
                                                
43 The other example of biological degradation of EDTA developed by Akzo Nobel offers only a rather 
limited range of application because of atypical alkaline conditions of pH>8.5 required. 
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because EDTA users seemed to be rather sceptical about this technology in view of 
perceived additional waste water management skills and costs required and of its still 
unproven technical viability at the operational level of industrial plants. BASF, on the 
contrary, disposes of the resources and established relationships with customers to 
finance upscaling experiments testing MGDA, to influence market access by appropri-
ate marketing campaigns, and to weather temporary lacking market acceptance. Thus, 
gradual though limited market penetration of MGDA meanwhile can be observed 
although it is more expensive than EDTA and its performance as a biodegradable 
medium-strong chelating agent is not as good as that of EDTA44. 
Comparing different EDTA substitutes offered by BASF, such as ISDA, MGDA, DTPA, 
PDTA or NTA, their market success or failure most likely correlates with their technical 
viability and market acceptance, whereas the supporting corporate capacities, which 
have not been studied, were probably the same, though not necessarily so. 
Comparing corporate capacities and market chances of the two enzyme-based 
cleaning procedures tested by MILEI, they can be judged as rather equal. It were 
technical problems that let MILEI decide after one and a half years to change from one 
enzyme-based cleaning procedure to another. 
Thus, the examples confirm that usually anyone of all major criteria listed, namely 
technical maturity and reliability, safety and environmental compatibility, relative 
advantages in cost, corporate capacity and market opportunity (largely determined by 
the range of possible applications), alone is crucial for market success of environmental 
innovations. 
5.3 The impact of political action and regulatory framework conditions 
From the research perspective of this case study to investigate the role of EP, ETP and 
EP/ETP cooperation in stimulating and supporting environmental innovation it has to be 
asked if and how both political action and regulatory structures mattered for EDTA-
related environmental innovations. 
Concerning the funding of corresponding R&D projects, technology p icy obviously 
played only a minor role because it expected industries to finance relevant R&D by 
themselves, at least as long as EDTA use is not concretely regulated or prohibited. The 
BMBF co-funded a university project on biological EDTA degradation once, but was not 
interested in funding the subsequent project because of a parallel project proposal 
addressed to the AIF. Because many EDTA users are medium and small sized 
companies, they are reluctant to undergo the bureaucratic procedures required for 
public R&D subsidies. Moreover, public resources were spent within measurent 
programs and related studies on data gathering concerning EDTA and other not readily 
biodegradable chelating agents, which did not intend to induce environm tal 
innovations per se. 
                                                
44 Compared with EDTA, the presently available knowledge about its potential environmental impacts is 
poorer, too. 
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In order to foster EDTA reduction efforts reducing EDTA use and release in industries, 
UBA strove to disseminate corresponding R&D results by providing leaflets and 
information brochures, and by approaching responsible industrial associations. 
Concerning policy impact, it was mainly the interplay of existing or aspired environ-
mental regulations and environmental policy action, described above, that created 
political pressure on industries to also invest in R&D projects in favour of reducing or 
avoiding EDTA release. 
Leaving aside local experiments with and applications of new technologies because of 
expected or experienced EP activities and regulations, which led to adaptive 
innovations concerning process optimisation (see the examples of MILEI and, partly, 
BASF), the major innovative efforts refer to EDTA substitutes and their application in 
formulations and cleaning devices, on the one hand, and to improvements in machinery 
and processing technology primarily oriented towards overall efficiency gains and thus 
savings in energy, water and materials needed, on the other hand, which implicitly lead 
to reduced EDTA release. These innovative efforts, however, are mainly undertaken by 
large corporations who decide to do so because they view them embedded in their 
general R&D strategies, namely to search in general for promising substances to be 
utilised in new formulations, new application technologies, r even new areas of 
application and to be sold globally. They do so because they expect to develop an - at 
least in the long run45 - profitable product needed to remain competitive on the world 
market. And they do so because corporate strategies of responsible care meanwhile 
are in many cases rather well established46 l ading to systematic regard of enviro-
mental concerns in corporate strategies and decisions (cf. Conrad 1998). Clearly, within 
these corporate strategic orientations EDTA reduction is only one (minor) element to be 
aimed at by R&D projects, which generate their own dynamics, however, to be carried 
on and to lead to marketable products, once they have been started. 
Thus, already for economic reasons these innovative efforts did not result from 
(corporate) reaction to specific EP activities or (pending) regulations in one particular 
country such as Germany. 
Thus, within a certain variation according to innovation type and area of application, EP 
may have well enhanced market introduction of environmental innovations described 
above, but hardly induced them. This may be somewhat different in case of strict 
unequivocal environmental regulations, but even then a corporation with a global reach 
will balance probable costs and benefits of necessary R&D investments against 
transferring its production processes concerned or leaving one national market 
concerning those products affected by these regulations. Typically, industrial lobbying is 
                                                
45 For instance, if EDDS will be used in large quantities and will be offered by more than one producer in 
the future, there is good reason to believe that its production and application costs should not be much 
different from those of EDTA, as indicated by Procter & Gamble in the detergent sector which had 
already replaced EDTA by EDDS in its cleaning systems. 
46 These strategies originated from realising the (indirect) costs likely to be borne at least in the longer 
run, which are affiliated with emissions polluting the environment and with the negative image of an 
environmental polluter. 
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strong enough to avoid in most cases legal ban of hazardous substances and products 
until profitable alternatives have been developed (cf. Jacob 1999). 
6 Interpretation perspectives 
This section summarizes the major factors at different levels underlying EDTA-related 
environmental innovations, with special consideration of policymaking and interpolicy 
coordination. This is done in conformity with an interpretation perspective according to 
which the interaction dynamics of structural, institutional, actor, situational, problem 
perspective and strategic capability factors ultimately determine innovation processes. 
Because the innovation processes addressed have not been studied on a micro-level, 
only plausible appraisals and no compelling evidence about the significance of the 
factors identified here can be given. Certainly, the theoretically crucial reference to the 
interaction dynamics of structural, institutional, situational, framing and action- riented 
factors of influence which tend to mutually reinforce their impact on the innovation 
processes appears to be a reasonable conceptual assumption. Without their substantial 
description, however, the conclusion that these interaction dynamics essentially 
underlie the innovation processes described remains only a plausible hypothesis not 
tested by empirical reconstruction and evaluation. 
6.1 Structural framework conditions 
Structural framework conditions refer to the manifold (contextual) settings that influence 
the direction and evolution of social processes independent of actors' (current) 
articulation of interests and modes of procedure. Concerning the EDTA-related 
environmental innovations described, these structural framework conditions relate in 
particular to the domains of ecology and health, economics, corporate organisation and 
culture, law, politics and administration, general sociocultural conditions, and the 
(national) innovation system. Without going into their in principle endless description, I 
summarize key contextual settings already described in previous sections.
Environmental and health problems and corresponding sociopolitical concerns mattered 
as legitimate (rational) criteria to question EDTA release and to structure corresponding 
controversy, to examine regulation of EDTA use and to negotiate voluntary agreements 
on reducing EDTA release, and as potential sources of economic costs due to 
(additional) environmental protection measures required, or due to losses in market 
share resulting from the negative image of being an environmental polluter. 
Economic criteria and judgements largely determined investment in R&D projects 
developing EDTA substitutes and their market success.  
Corporate organisation and culture allowed to pursue longer term R&D projects in large 
chemical corporations producing chelating agents or supplying them in their (cleaning) 
products, whereas the corporate organisation and culture of many EDTA users 
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reflected their more short term orientation to quickly react to market fluctuations. 
Furthermore, the respect for responsible care as a corporate goal of the chemical 
industry (VCI 1999) helped the industry accept the EDTA issue as a legitimate area for 
corporate measures to be taken. The preferenc  for voluntary agreements by politico-
administrative bodies partly deviated from predominant approaches of bureaucratic 
procedure and control, but was well in line with the growing practice of public-private 
covenants in environmental policy, seen as a remedy to unimplementable traditional 
command-and-control policy when addressing complex regulatory issues (cf. Knebel et 
al. 1999). 
The relevant legal, political and administrative conditions concerned licensing 
procedures and costs required for new substances such as IDS or EDDS, the doubtful 
legal justifiability of a ban on EDTA, the German federal system of dividing 
responsibilities between federal, state and municipal authorities, the significance of 
environmental regulation on the EU level, and the legally justified confidence of ETP 
that necessary private R&D investments can be expected. 
General sociocultural conditions47 typically tend to play the role of background variables 
where some of them, namely general environmental awareness and the eigendynamic 
of a commitment once it has been made, probably did support the innovation 
processes. The German landscape of R&D institutions and technology policy arrange-
ments could well support EDTA-related research, but was hardly important for EDTA-
related innovations because major R&D projects and their funding occurred in R&D 
units of large chemical corporations located in various Western countries. 
6.2 Actor networks and institutional eigendynamic 
The actor constellation can be characterized as many, often loose etworks constituted 
according to a sectoral and a functional dimension which refer to the various industry 
sectors concerned and to research, business and regulatory tasks, respectiv ly. That 
this actor constellation is not a mere analytical construct, created by the EDTA focus of 
this case study, is due to the mutual communication processes installed by the annual 
EDTA meetings, which generate some common orientation and affiliation of these 
networks. The BMU and later UBA were the key environmental policy actors that 
primarily initiated and organised these communication fora focusing on EDTA, first, on 
the one hand, and reorienting them to more general issues such as not readily 
biodegradable chelating agents, on the other hand. 
                                                
47 One may list here the modernization capacity of a society, the importance of the state and public 
policy, the importance of public debate and the equivalent strength of civil society, the extent of division 
into different social classes or strata, the degree of public participation and s cio-structurally 
entrenched substantive democracy, the significance of self-responsibility and liability of social actors, 
the degree of legalism, decentralized versus centralized (political) culture and decision-making 
procedures, the importance of postmaterialistic value orientations, environmental awareness of and 
behaviour by main actors and the population in general, and the significance and social influence of 
environmental NGOs. 
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Concerning EDTA-related R&D projects, the corresponding knowledge networks usually 
pursued their tasks in a cooperative manner and professional atmosphere, though the 
project results were quickly translated within the related business networks into 
(economically justified) decisions to go on or to finish a test experiment and into 
marketing strategies likely to oversell the product developed.48 Furthermore, the 
willingness of most actors, involved in EDTA discourse and politics, to communiate, 
collaborate, and commit themselves to voluntary declarations or agreements in spite of 
opposing opinions and interests was stimulated by the structural framework conditions 
just listed, and also contributed to some degree to engagement in innovative efforts of 
substituting EDTA use or reducing its release. 
Once personal commitments had been made, usually an institutional eigendynamic49 
developed to some degree in all network types, be it knowledge, business or regulatory 
networks. As indicated by concrete examples described above, these networks 
stabilised the activities started and tended to mutually reinforce each other, because 
normally development of an EDTA substitute, investments in its production, marketing 
and sale, and regulatory action in favour of EDTA substitution mutually presuppose 
each other. Therefore the juxtaposition of these institutional eigendynamics quite likely 
was favourable for EDTA-related innovation processes. 
To emphasize the role of an institutional eigendynamic does not invalidate, however, 
the essential role ofindividuals and situational factors. Whereas the significance of the 
BMU ministerial director's commitment and political competence for initiating EDTA 
meetings and achieving the EDTA declaration has to be underlined, although it had no 
direct impact on related R&D projects, the interest of BASF as a member of the 
chemical industry in overcoming its negative (public) image as an environmental 
polluter in the late 1980s and its established waste minimization program were 
favourable situational factors supporting the considerable efforts of BASF to drastically 
reduce its EDTA release. Similarly, the low and varying price of Bayer's basic chemical 
MSA, inevitably occurring in chemical production processes of some production units, 
was a major situational factor inducing the development of IDS. 
6.3 Varying problem perspectives and strategies for solutions 
As pointed out in section 5.1 the cognitive framing and corresponding evaluation of 
EDTA use and release of actors varied considerably in significant conformity with their 
(organisational) interests. These differences mattered when judging the necessity and 
urgency to take efforts towards reducing EDTA release, as well as preferable points of 
departure for these efforts (e.g. waste water treatment versus purification of drinking 
water). They mattered much less, however, when discussing the basic reduction 
options of EDTA release (renunciation, reduction, substitution, degradation), and when 
                                                
48 Corresponding examples are ADA propagated by Agfa, or alkaline biodegradation advertised by Akzo 
Nobel. 
49 This institutional eigendynamic typically stems from (central) underlying (formal) organisational 
interests. 
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developing specific products and technologies in this respect. This feature is due to the 
fact that the actors actually involved in a certain EDTA topic were well aware of these 
different options, and recognised and admitted that the advantage of one of them is 
debatable. For it depends on features such as its technical and social viability, its 
relative costs, its environmental impacts compared to those of the other options, and 
the size of EDTA release to be avoided, which all vary according to the area and type of 
EDTA application.50 Furthermore, for the success of an innovation, criteria of technical 
and economic viability tend to count more than general personal preferences and 
valuations of those, who are (as scientists) professionally engaged in actual R&D 
projects.51 
Thus, one may conclude that problem perspectives and strategies for solutions, shaped 
by the economic, political and technological selection environment, influenced the 
selection of R&D projects considered worthwhile. The R&D processes themselves, 
however, followed a rather predictable technological trajectory (cf. Dosi 1982, Nelson/ 
Winter 1982) and were in their substantive results less influenced by these general 
cognitive framings. Again, the (EDTA-related) problem perspectives and strategies for 
solutions of those promoters and implementers, who have sufficient pow r and 
capacity, have well influenced acceptance and diffusion of these environmental 
innovations as a whole, comprising their economic and social viability as well. 
6.4 The role of policy making and interpolicy coordination 
As described in previous sections, EP institutions played a key role in setting EDTA on 
the political agenda and in organising information gathering and exchange, voluntary 
declarations and agreements, and effective action. The in functional terms relevant 
ETP institutions were UBA and the PTWT which are subordinate to the central 
environmental policy and technology policy bodies, i.e. BMU and BMBF respectively. 
They did some funding of R&D projects and kept track of ongoing R&D activities at a 
survey level, as recorded in the documents of the annual EDTA meetings.  
As major innovative activities addressing reduction and substitution of EDTA use or 
release were primarily undertaken in large chemical corporations rather uninfluenced by 
                                                
50 A striking example is the technical viability of three out of the four basic options concerning EDTA use 
in photo baths: EDTA release can be reduced by rather closed cycle photo processing systems thereby 
minimizing waste accumulation and EDTA diversion in particular; EDTA use can be substituted or 
reduced by (adding) EDDS, which is expensive, or by PDTA, which is also a not readily biodegradable 
chelating agent; EDTA can be biodegraded by bacteria, what is assumed to be relatively cheap; or 
EDTA use can be continued in new machinery where the waste can be processed and then reused in 
the cement industry, which may well turn out to be the cheapest future option. 
51 This assertion does not deny that scientifically based empirical statements are in the last resort always 
shaped by normative conceptualizations, but it denies their arbitrariness against constructivist theories. 
Certainly, criteria of technical or economic viability leave considerable room for interpretation (cf. 
Ravetz 1971, Freeman 1974), but do not permit arbitrary judgements. For instance, it may well be 
possible to argue the superiority of the enzyme-based cleaning procedure of Henkel Ecolab over that 
of DiverseyLever, but one can hardly argue that each of these cleaning systems does not avoid use of 
EDTA. 
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ETP, it played only a minor role concerning EDTA-related environmental innovations, 
whereas EP probably at least pressed industries to tackle them. 
Furthermore, policy making played some role in the innovation processes by deciding 
upon environmental and technical standards and by licensing new substances and 
technologies in the regulatory networks. In view of these circumstances there was no 
need for effective EP/ETP interpolicy cooperation beyond ordinary coordination routines 
(see Conrad 2000a), particularly because UBA as the key actor took responsibility to 
care for both EP and ETP matters from 1992 on. 
Nevertheless, weaknesses of interpolicy coordination can be identified in at least two 
respects. Because of differing interests and orientations in different policy areas, such 
as water and chemistry policy, as well as in federal, state and municipal EP institutions 
the corresponding need for bargaining and coordinating processes within the field of 
environmental policy sometimes led to unsatisfactory results if claiming a clear and 
consistent EP. Whereas these deficiencies cannot be completely avoided within the 
given institutional setting of EP and showed no extraordinary extent, coordinating efforts 
between environmental and health policy, i.e. between BMU and BMG, and more 
substantively between UBA and BgVV, to balance their differing concerns of 
environmental protection and health care, took rather long time until the diverging policy 
recommendations to substitute slowly biodegradable EDTA by rapidly biodegradable 
NTA, and to avoid NTA use because of potential carcinogenic risks were explicitly 
reconciled around 1995 by recommending NTA as an EDTA substitute only up to 
certain amounts. This agreement could have been achieved more rapidly, especially in 
view of the understandable unwillingness of industries to substitute technically highly 
useful, but not readily biodegradable EDTA by another chelating agent NTA which is 
questioned for analogous safety reasons by health policy or even legally restricted to 
special applications in other countries. 
7 Typical features and summarizing conclusions 
This final section tries to summarize the main characteristics of the case study and to 
draw corresponding conclusions, first concerning EDTA discourse and politics, and then 
concerning EDTA-related environmental innovations. 
1. The rise of EDTA as an environmental issue was due to incidental recognition of 
high EDTA concentrations in surface waters in NTA-related measurement 
programs, political pressure of water utilities to prohibit significant EDTA release in 
waste water, the engagement of EP to find a viable regulatory solution to this 
environmental problem, and the willingness of the chemical industry, particularly 
BASF, to reduce EDTA release in order not to undermine viable dialogue 
established with water supply utilities. 
2. Despite a lack of similar endeavours in other countries EP succeeded in stimulating 
efforts to significantly reduce EDTA release, in particular by aspiring to a voluntary 
declaration and subsequent voluntary agreements. Supported by continuous debate 
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in EDTA meetings and by the eigendynamic of commitments made by participating 
actors, these efforts led to substantial results, though not as much as had been 
envisaged. It appears less likely that these results would have been equally 
achieved by attempts o pass general formal environmental regulations on EDTA 
production, use or emission. 
3. This environmental policy success was certainly facilitated by contextual conditions 
such as the strong interest of companies to avoid direct environmental criticism and 
blame, or situational economic incentives for chemical corporations to search for 
EDTA substitutes (e.g. IDS). Thus, environmental concerns primarily mattered 
because they were coupled to private and public R&D interests as well as corporate 
economic and genuine political (organisational) interests of important actors based 
on the overall social legitimacy and significa ce of environmental protection and 
ecological sustainability. 
4. The cognitive framings of the actors participating in EDTA discourse and politics 
clearly varied in accordance with their interests and problem perspectives. The 
social learning processes resulting from EDTA-related debate and action 
contributed to the change and differentiation of these cognitive framings. In 
particular most actors recognised the need to distinguish between different areas of 
EDTA use, to involve and to coordinate EDTA producers, suppliers and users, to 
balance the impacts and viability of different (technical-fix) strategies capable to 
reduce EDTA release (renunciation, reduction, substitution, and degradation), and 
to replace the ecologically inappropriate focus on a single substance EDTA by 
embedding it in a broader perspective. Such a perspective comparatively assesses 
the various environmental and health impacts of chelating agents in general (e.g. 
the study carried out by the ESWE institute mentioned above in footnote 16) and 
relativizes the environmental importance to avoid EDTA release in view of other well 
feasible and more beneficial environmental improvements. 
5. In such a more holistic ecological perspective environmental trade-offs in several 
dimensions became obvious, such as substitution versus well-functioning waste 
management of EDTA, or considerable savings in water and energy consumption 
versus avoidance of a specific substance, implying some potential negative 
environmental impacts but no serious health risks52, n photo processing systems. 
6. Similar to the fundamental difficulties and limitations of EP to influence and control 
environmental behaviour of the population at large, consisting of millions of individ-
ual consumers, EP ultimately had to rely on the willingness and commitment of 
many companies in diverse industries using EDTA in comparatively small amounts 
in order to reduce EDTA release, stimulated by persuasive action of relevant 
industrial associations which had been approached by EP for this purpose. 
Because there were only few people in the BMU and in UBA in charge of dealing 
with EDTA subjects in detail, EP was not only confronted with inevitably high 
                                                
52 This trade-off between quantity and quality underlies a criticism voiced against the MIPS concept, 
advanced by Schmidt-Bleek 1994. 
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transaction costs when addressing and controlling specific sources of EDTA release 
but also with a task overload due to scarce personnel that had to keep track of and 
administer its activities.53 
7. In spite of partly prevailing mutually unfavourable stereotyped perceptions of 
economic and political actors, respectively, cooperative attitude and concerted 
action stimulated by the BMU and later on by UBA resulted in effectively tackling an 
environmental issue by voluntary declaration and agreement without remarkable 
public controversy, without involvement of environmental action groups, and without 
legal conflicts between public bodies and private industrial corporations.54 
Otherwise, undoubtedly more manpower and time would have been mustered for 
EDTA discourse and politics. 
Concerning EDTA-related environmental innovations, only some general observations 
can be presented, because individual innovation processes have not been investigated 
at the micro-level. 
1. The economic, political and technological selection environment determined to a 
considerable degree the various technological trajectories followed by the 
innovation processes. 
2. The environmental innovations arising typically were technical process innovations 
or a combination of product and process innovation rearranging and optimising 
chemical processes in various industries using EDTA. 
3. Concerning producers and suppliers of chelating agents, their EDTA-related 
innovative efforts were embedded in general research programs elucidating the 
pronounced strategic capabilities of corporations such as BASF, Bayer, Henkel or 
Unilever in managing innovations. 
4. Significantly, being strongly opposed to further duties to extract chemicals released 
into water bodies, water utilities pursued only small-scale R&D activities to eliminate 
EDTA in water treatment plants, for example by ozoning or oxidation processes. 
5. Without significant public funding policy making and interpolicy coordination of EP 
and ETP in most cases had at best an indirect impact on these innovation 
processes reinforcing them to some degree by promoting regulatory framework 
conditions and monitoring programs. 
6. Consequently, various relatively separated knowledge, business and regulatory 
networks originated from these EDTA-related innovative efforts. 
7. Comparing different R&D projects leading to technically viable environmental 
innovations of reducing, substituting, or degrading EDTA (use), the central 
importance of corporate capacities and market opportunities for their successful 
                                                
53 Already the transfer of the task to organise the annual EDTA meetings from the BMU to UBA was 
partly due to cut-backs in personnel within the corresponding BMU unit. 
54 Certainly, this is more likely to happen as long as no key product or key production process is 
concerned by environmental policy regulation. 
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diffusion becomes obvious. Thus, serious obstacles to the innovation processes 
referred more to their social than to their technical and time dimension. 
8. The focus on EDTA as a single substance, partly enforced by EP, is in general 
inappropriate for achieving innovative environmental improvements in their most 
beneficial form. These potentials can be better recognised in a more holistic 
perspective aiming at ecological sustainability, assessing environmental impacts of 
the whole cradle-to-grave value chain encompassing the total product life-cycle, and 
taking into account trade-offs between different environmental objectives. 
Therefore, environmental innovations addressing chemical processing arrange-
ments as a whole typically include many more environmental improvements than 
EDTA substitution. They require, for instance, cooperation between the machine 
building and chemical industries to develop closed cycle photographic processing 
systems, where the recovered waste material can still be reused in the cement 
industry. In the EDTA discourse this option was consciously taken into account, 
however, neither by the photochemical industry nor by environmental policy. 
Altogether, environmental policy successfully organised multiple efforts to reduce EDTA 
release on the basis of voluntary agreements in Germany. These voluntary agreements 
enhanced, but did hardly induce corresponding environmental innovatio s, mainly in 
industry, and also contributed to learning processes among the actors, participating in 
EDTA discourse and politics, in the direction of a more holistic (policy) perspective 
towards ecological sustainability. 
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